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CONTRACT AND PROCEDURE
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL
PETER B. RUTLEDGE
This paper examines both the theoretical underpinnings and empirical
picture of procedural contracts. Procedural contracts may be understood
as contracts in which parties regulate not merely their commercial
relations but also the procedures by which disputes over those relations
will be resolved. Those procedural contracts regulate not simply the
forum in which disputes will be resolved (arbitration vs. litigation) but
also the applicable procedural framework (discovery, class action
waivers, remedies limitations, etc.). At a theoretical level, this paper
explores both the limits on parties’ ability to regulate procedure by
contract (at issue in the Supreme Court's recent Rent-A-Center decision)
and the scope of an arbitrator’s ability to fill gaps in parties’ procedural
contracts (at issue in the Supreme Court’s recent Stolt-Nielsen decision).
At an empirical level, this paper taps a largely unexplored database of
credit card contracts available from the Federal Reserve in order to
examine actual practices in the use of procedural contracts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, in their seminal article Contract and Jurisdiction,
Paul Carrington and Paul Haagen lamented the explosion of devices
that manipulated jurisdiction by contract. In their view, various devices,
including forum selection clauses and arbitration clauses, enabled
sophisticated parties to lock-in significant tactical advantages (especially
over their less sophisticated counter-parties) through the enforceable
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designation of an exclusive forum before a dispute ever arose. While
Carrington’s and Haagen’s lament garnered significant academic
2
support, judicial tides turned in the other direction. Courts largely
accepted these contractual forum selection devices, subject to a narrow
3
range of exceptions. Although the authors’ critique has recently gained
4
new traction in legislative corridors, including most recently the 2010
5
financial reform law, it is no exaggeration to say that, with little
exception, parties presently can largely control jurisdiction by contract.
If judicial battles over contract and jurisdiction have subsided, the
larger contest is far from over. Rather, we have entered an era in which
the battles are fought not over parties’ ability to control jurisdiction by
contract but, instead, over their ability to control procedure by contract.
In her important article, Procedure as Contract, Judith Resnik identified
one manifestation of this modern phenomenon—bargaining over
procedural rights after litigation commences (such as vacatur of orders
6
following settlement). Here, we address a related but underexplored
manifestation—bargaining over procedural rights even before a dispute
arises, a form of bargaining catalyzed by the judicial acceptance of

1. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 351–61.
2. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution
in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 passim (2002); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice:
Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577 passim
(1997); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1335 passim (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of
the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 passim (1997).
3. See, e.g., Krenkel v. Kerzner Int’l Hotels Ltd., 579 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2009)
(holding that forum selection clauses are presumptively enforceable); Richardson v. Palm
Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that arbitration agreements
are presumptively enforceable); Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(holding that forum selection clauses are presumptively enforceable); Harris v. Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that arbitration agreements are
presumptively enforceable).
4. See 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835–36 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2006)); John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364,
§ 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2006)); Food, Conservation,
and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No 110-246, § 11005, 122 Stat. 1651, 2119 (codified at 7
U.S.C. § 197c(a) (Supp. III 2007–2010)); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010,
Pub L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409, 3454–55 (2010) (“Franken Amendment”).
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 921, 1028, 1414(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841, 2003–04, 2151 (2010).
6. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 650 (2005).
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arbitration over the last several decades. We refer to such pre-dispute
agreements as “procedural contracts.”
“Procedural contracts” take various forms. They may incorporate
by reference the rules of arbitral institutions, which, in Resnik’s terms,
8
function like “mini-codes of civil procedure.”
Alternatively (and
increasingly), they also may be explicit terms of the parties’ contract,
decoupled from the rules of an administering institution. Because the
rules of most arbitral institutions operate as default rules that can be
overridden by the express terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement—
subject to the willingness of institutions to administer arbitrations under
9
the agreed terms —these explicit terms represent private procedural
codes that arbitrators are duty-bound to apply unless they (or courts)
declare them unenforceable.
The terms of procedural contracts vary widely. One current, hotly
contested term is a prospective waiver of the ability to pursue a claim on
10
a class wide basis. When these waivers seek to preclude class actions in
court, they are known as “class-action waivers”; when they seek to
preclude arbitration from proceeding on a class wide basis, they are

7. Others have examined the ability to customize the litigation process by contract. See,
e.g., Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum,
Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM
L. REV. 291 (1988); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to
Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579
(2007); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814, 856–78 (2006); Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL.
181; see also David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum
Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973 (2008). In the context of
arbitration agreements, a few articles have addressed procedural contracts though without the
degree of empirical evidence or normative argument we address here. See David Horton,
Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 41–53, on file
with authors) [hereinafter Horton, Arbitration as Delegation]; available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665565 (arguing that FAA was an unconstitutional delegation of
procedural rule-making authority); David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure
and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 646–53 (2010) (opposing unilateral
modification of the procedural terms of arbitration clauses) [hereinafter Horton, The Shadow
Terms]; Meredith R. Miller, Contracting out of Process, Contracting out of Corporate
Accountability: An Argument Against Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Limits on Process, 75
TENN. L. REV. 365, 371 (2008) (opposing procedural contracts in arbitration agreements).
8. Resnik, supra note 6, at 597.
9. See the discussion of the Due Process Protocols, infra text accompanying note 71.
10. For an insightful discussion of the developments in this area, see generally Richard
A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1–2, on file with authors), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1670722.
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known as “class-arbitration waivers.” Examples of other terms include
contractual limits on the availability of discovery, contractually imposed
limitations periods, formulas allocating dispute resolution costs,
limitations on remedies, provisions reallocating the power to assess the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement, and efforts to alter the
12
standard of judicial review of an arbitration award.
Viewing these developments through the lens of contract enables us
to tap into the rich literature on contract theory and, thereby, facilitates
systematic thinking about procedural contracts. As with any agreement,
procedural contracts raise important questions, both positive and
normative. Positive questions include: To what extent do parties
actually attempt to regulate their disputes through procedural contracts?
Why do parties sometimes leave particular procedural questions
unresolved in their contracts despite incentives to address them? When
a procedural contract is silent as to a particular matter, how do decision
13
makers (such as arbitrators) fill the gap? Normative questions include:
Should there be limits on parties’ freedom to enter into procedural
contracts? Assuming that limits should exist, what blend of oversight
achieves the optimal degree of regulation? What are the limits on
arbitrators’ authority to fill the gaps in procedural contracts? What is
the proper role of courts in policing arbitrators’ gap-filling authority?
The answers to these questions implicate important stakes. For
example, critics of class-action and class-arbitration waivers argue that
14
these waivers can operate as exculpatory clauses,
effectively
eliminating any incentive for individual litigants to bring lawsuits when
their damages are nugatory. By contrast, defenders argue that they
represent an invaluable tool to control the runaway costs of aggregate
litigation and, by reducing a company’s expected dispute resolution

11. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 376 n.15 (2005) (distinguishing between
“collective action waivers” and “class action waivers”).
12. See Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial
Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal
Landscape, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 504 (2009); Miller, supra note 7, at 381–99
(discussing use of collective action waivers, limits on discovery, and shorter limitations
periods).
13. This assumes, of course, that silence in a procedural contract is properly
conceptualized as a gap that the arbitrator is authorized to fill (as opposed to a deliberate
omission designed to strip the arbitrator of the power to enter a particular procedural order).
We address this idea in greater detail in Part III, infra.
14. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 157, 169 (2006); Miller, supra note 7, at 367–68.
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costs, benefit individuals in the form of lower prices (or, in the context
15
of employment contracts, higher wages).
In light of these deep
underlying policy disagreements, courts unsurprisingly have reached
conflicting conclusions over the enforceability of procedural contracts
16
containing these terms.
For similar reasons, procedural contracts have caught the Supreme
Court’s attention in recent years. The current era of the Court’s
jurisprudence on procedural contracts can be traced to the Court’s 1995
decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, which addressed the
parties’ ability to allocate contractually the power to determine the
17
enforceability of an arbitration clause. More recently, two decisions
from October Term 2009 have tackled additional issues in the law
governing procedural contracts. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,
building on First Options, addressed whether a court has the power to
rule on an unconscionability challenge to an arbitration agreement even
18
when the parties’ contract vests that power in the arbitrator. StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. addressed whether the
arbitrator can order class arbitration when the arbitration agreement
19
neither explicitly authorizes nor explicitly prohibits such a device.
Using Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen as the springboards for our
discussion, we undertake a systematic examination of the positive and
20
normative questions underpinning procedural contracts. In brief, our
15. See Stephen J. Ware, The Case For Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—
with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 253–54
(2006).
16. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding
class arbitration waiver unenforceable because it precludes claimants from vindicating their
statutory rights); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006); Ting v. AT&T,
319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding class arbitration waiver unconscionable);
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless
LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 274–75 (Ill. 2006).
17. 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). Others date the incentive to design procedural contracts to
the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Bazzle. See Miller, supra note 7, at 374. But we believe
that First Options created the necessary conditions nearly a decade earlier and believe that
the empirical research offered here supports that view. See infra note 35 and accompanying
text.
18. 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2775 (2010).
19. 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1764 (2010). This article was already in press when the Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Concepcion. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740 (2011). Although we reserve detailed analysis of Concepcion for future work, we do
note that the Court’s decision is consistent with our analysis here. See infra text
accompanying notes 225–27.
20. For an excellent analysis of the decisions in Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen, see
generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Revelation and Reaction: The Struggle to Shape American
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argument consists of four propositions:
 First, parties, particularly sophisticated parties drafting form
contracts with unsophisticated parties, are increasingly entering
into procedural contracts. (Hereinafter we call this the exercise
of “procedural contractual freedom.”) Over time, the terms of
these procedural contracts are becoming more detailed,
although interesting variations appear in the use of certain
terms. For example, while the use of class-arbitration waivers
has grown, the use of discovery limits remains surprisingly
static.
 Second, while a variety of mechanisms might be used to
regulate procedural contracts, a blend of private self-regulation
and case-by-case judicial oversight likely offers the optimal
regime. We evaluate this regime as compared to more
paternalistic forms of regulation such as oversight by
administrative agencies or outright statutory bans.
 Third, arbitrators have not developed a consistent method for
determining how to fill procedural gaps—such as the
availability of class relief—in arbitration.
 Fourth, while perhaps adopting the correct gap-filler in StoltNielsen, the Supreme Court overstepped in that case when it
trimmed arbitrators’ gap-filling authority to render procedural
rulings in the face of silent agreements.
This argument unfolds in three parts. Part I surveys the history of
procedural contracts. It then turns to the empirical record, examining
data on changes in franchise arbitration clauses over time to illustrate
how some procedural contracts have evolved. Finally, Part I examines
why some parties, even when presented with this opportunity, have
declined to undertake it.
Part II examines the theoretical issues at the core of Rent-ACenter—namely the scope of parties’ freedom to enter into procedural
contracts. Rent-A-Center concerned the use of a particular term that
allocates to the arbitrator the exclusive authority to resolve challenges
to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement. Part II draws on
several data sources, including one that, to our knowledge, has not

Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers forthcoming 2011).
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previously been examined in the arbitration literature—namely the
Federal Reserve Board’s recently created and incredibly rich database
of credit card agreements, set up under the Credit Card Accountability
21
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, to examine the frequency
with which parties employ this term across different types of
agreements. It also examines the potential impact of Rent-A-Center for
a wider array of arbitration agreements that do not explicitly reallocate
the power to rule on the enforceability of the arbitration agreement but
arguably do so implicitly through incorporation of arbitral rules. Part II
then turns to the normative question lying at the heart of Rent-ACenter—namely the proper limits on procedural contractual freedom. It
introduces several possible models—including self-regulation, judicial
oversight, administrative regulation, and legislative action. It defends a
blend of self-regulation and case-by-case judicial oversight as the
optimal form of regulation and responds to several potential objections
to this approach.
Part III examines the theoretical issues at the core of Stolt-Nielsen—
namely how arbitrators fill gaps in the parties’ procedural contract.
Stolt-Nielsen concerned a particular type of gap—the agreement’s
silence as to the availability of class arbitration. Examining awards in
class arbitrations administered by American Arbitration Association,
Part III finds that arbitrators have not developed a consistent method
for filling procedural gaps in an arbitration agreement when the
agreement does not expressly address class arbitration. Part III then
turns to the normative question lying at the heart of Stolt-Nielsen—the
proper scope of an arbitrator’s gap-filling authority. We argue that the
Court took too crabbed a view of the arbitrator’s gap-filling authority.
After examining the implications of the Court’s decision beyond the
issue of class arbitration, we urge courts to construe the decision
narrowly in order to reaffirm a more deferential approach to an
arbitrator’s gap-filling authority.
The conclusion explores the implications of this analysis for issues
currently before the Court and Congress. As to the judicial agenda, the
grant of certiorari (and recent decision) in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion signals the Court’s continued interest in procedural
22
contracts. Concepcion presents difficult issues of FAA preemption and
highlights the interaction between procedural contract freedom and
21. Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).
22. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010).
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judicial oversight—themes central to our analysis. Our analysis suggests
that the issue was more difficult than the majority admitted but,
ultimately, supports the majority’s conclusion that the FAA preempts
judicial doctrines finding arbitration clauses unconscionable based on
the mere presence of a class-arbitration waiver. As to the Congressional
agenda, several recent enactments and pending bills signal a continued
legislative interest in procedural contracts. The recently enacted
financial reform bill prohibits arbitration of certain claims created by the
statute and authorizes several federal agencies (including the newly
created Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection) to prohibit or
23
regulate arbitration agreements in certain industries.
Even more
sweepingly, the Arbitration Fairness Act would completely prohibit pre24
dispute arbitration agreements in consumer and employment contracts.
Our analysis suggests that Congress may have acted hastily when it
adopted the anti-arbitration provisions in the financial reform bill and
should proceed cautiously before further restricting procedural
contractual freedom.
II. PROCEDURAL CONTRACTS: HISTORY AND TRENDS
This part does two things. First, it examines the history of efforts to
control procedure through contract. Second, it provides an empirical
snapshot of the trends in efforts to control procedure through contract.
A. History
The history of contract and procedure in the United States can be
divided into three eras: (1) prior to the FAA’s enactment (until 1925),
(2) following the FAA’s enactment during the era of non-arbitrability
(from 1925 until the mid-1980s), and (3) following the demise of the
non-arbitrability doctrine until the present day (from the mid-1980s to
25
the present day).
23. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 921, 1028, 1414(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841, 2003–04, 2151 (2010).
24. See S. 987, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
25. For alternative surveys of the history, see Horton, The Shadow Terms, supra note 7,
at 611–23; Marcus, supra note 7, at 988–1015. We acknowledge that the second era may be
appropriately dated to the early 1970s when decisions like Bremen and Scherck laid the
intellectual groundwork for the demise of the non-arbitrability doctrine. See Carrington &
Haagen, supra note 1, at 352, 364. Nonetheless, we date the end of the second era at the
middle of the 1980s, for that is when the “international commerce” rationale for Bremen and
Scherck dropped out, and their underlying principles crept into purely domestic disputes.
That was the critical move which enabled procedural contracts to proliferate. See Resnik,
supra note 6, at 620.
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1. Pre-1925
Prior to the twentieth century, opportunities to control procedure by
contract were largely non-existent. Courts viewed such pre-dispute
agreements (whether forum selection clauses or arbitration clauses) with
suspicion, characterizing them as contracts that sought to “oust” courts
26
of jurisdiction and, consequently, violated public policy. During this
era, a party could control procedure only through forum shopping. By
filing a case in a particular forum (or seeking to have a case removed or
transferred to another forum), a party could influence the procedural
rules governing the dispute.
This type of crude procedural manipulation via forum shopping
differed from the sorts of devices described in the introduction (like
class-arbitration waivers) in two critical respects. First, parties enjoyed
far less autonomy—while they might choose from among different
systems of procedure (by, for example, filing in state court rather than
federal court), they had relatively little influence over the procedures
within a particular forum. Second, the decision over the applicable
procedure was not the result of pre-dispute bargaining between the
parties. Except in a rare case where one party chose not to object to its
adversary’s chosen forum, the applicable procedures for a dispute were
more the product of one party’s prevailing in a forum-shopping fight
than the product of a bilateral agreement between disputants.
2. The Non-Arbitrability Era
The enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act and the growing
judicial acceptance of forum selection clauses expanded opportunities
for controlling procedure through contract, but doctrines continued to
impose constraints. By putting arbitration agreements on the same
footing as contracts generally, the Federal Arbitration Act heralded the
possibility that parties, on a pre-dispute basis, could remove their
disputes from the courts and resolve them instead before private bodies.
To the extent the rules of those bodies allowed parties to design the
system for resolving disputes, the Federal Arbitration Act created the
possibility for parties to control procedure contractually too.
Yet the nonarbitrability doctrine supplied an important constraint
on this newfound power. Under that doctrine, many disputes arising
under federal statutes such as the securities laws, the antitrust laws, and

26. For a fuller discussion of this era, see Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 339–44;
Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 552 (2008).
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the civil rights laws were deemed to be nonarbitrable. The underlying
theory was that arbitration of such disputes was inconsistent with
Congress’s intent in creating a cause of action under those statutes.
Consequently, claims arising under those laws would remain in court,
where opportunities to influence procedure by contract remained
limited, not unlike the prior era when contractual forum clauses were
altogether unenforceable.
This bifurcation of arbitral disputes and nonarbitrable ones—which
largely prevailed from 1925 (the year of the FAA’s enactment) until the
1970s and 1980s (when the nonarbitrability doctrine began to
crumble)—had important consequences. Specifically, it meant that the
parties exercised their newfound power to contract for procedure
around particular types of claims, namely contract, tort, and other
common-law claims that did not run afoul of the nonarbitrability
doctrine’s limits. To the extent federal statutory claims presented
unique procedural challenges (on matters such as attorneys’ fees,
discovery, and class actions), parties had no incentive to invest much
time or attention in these matters.
3. Demise of the Non-Arbitrability Doctrine
Things changed in the 1970s and 1980s as the nonarbitrability
doctrine crumbled, and most claims (including federal statutory ones)
28
became arbitrable. The opportunities to control procedure by contract
expanded. The proliferation in the types of arbitrable claims created
greater opportunities to regulate procedure by contract. To the extent
these newly arbitrable claims presented unique procedural challenges
(for example, class actions, attorney’s fees, discovery), parties now had
an incentive—which they lacked in the earlier era that limited
arbitration to nonstatutory claims—to use their new contractual
freedom to regulate such matters.

27. E.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (“[W]e decide that the intention of
Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an
agreement for arbitration . . . .”).
28. In addition to the demise of the non-arbitrability doctrine, the scope of Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce expanded dramatically from 1925, when the FAA was
enacted, to the 1970s and 1980s. This expansion correspondingly increased the contracts to
which the FAA applied.
See Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland:
Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
101, 127–30 (2002).
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The steady erosion in the non-arbitrability doctrine paralleled the
29
Court’s growing judicial acceptance of forum selection clauses. While
these two strands of jurisprudence shared a common solicitude for
freedom of contract, their implications differed sharply. Enforceable
forum selection clauses enhanced parties’ abilities to site a case in a
court that had a favorable set of procedural rules (much like the crude
form of forum shopping described above) and, unlike that crude system,
enabled explicit pre-dispute bargaining over that forum. Once that
forum was fixed contractually, however, most rules of civil procedure
limited the parties’ ability to contract around its provisions. (To borrow
a gastronomic analogy, a party might pick from among several
restaurants but could not control what would be on the menu.)
In contrast to forum selection clauses, arbitration clauses have a
more profound effect on the procedure by which disputes are resolved.
Unlike rules of civil procedure, which function largely like mandatory
rules (around which parties cannot contract), most arbitral rules
function like default rules (generally subject only to the mandatory rules
of the arbitral forum). They generally provide that the arbitrator will
conduct the proceedings in a manner consistent with the parties’
agreement and, only when such agreement is lacking, may exercise his
or her discretion. To the extent arbitral rules regulate some aspect of an
arbitration, they often also contain a provision stating that the rules can
be modified by the agreement of the parties. The net effect of such
rules, which have no perfect analogue in most rules of civil procedure
for court systems, is to create far greater potential for parties to regulate
30
by contract the procedures by which their dispute will be resolved.
This newfound opportunity to control procedure by contract has
raised a host of challenging questions for the Supreme Court. Some
questions concern the limits on the parties’ freedom of contract. In
addition to Rent-A-Center, cases like Gilmer (involving a broadside
29. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991); Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1972).
30. We stress no “perfect” analogue because certain features of garden-variety civil
litigation are subject to agreement by the parties. For example, parties may enter into joint
stipulations under which they agree to fashion discovery along certain lines, or they may
agree on certain substantive questions, thereby eliminating the need for jury determination.
The critical difference between these devices and the devices that we describe here is that
procedural contracts like joint stipulations occur after the dispute has arisen (where both
parties have more information about the nature of the dispute) whereas the devices that
interest us here can be designed at the pre-dispute stage (where parties have relatively less
information about the course of any dispute). For a thoughtful analysis of this “relatively
unexplored” field, see Scott & Triantis, supra note 7, at 857–78.
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attack on arbitral procedures), Randolph (involving the enforceability of
fee-splitting rules in arbitration), and Hall Street (involving the
31
enforceability of contractually expanded judicial review of awards) fall
32
A separate set of questions concerns the proper
in this category.
default rules where the parties’ contract is silent. In addition to StoltNielsen, cases like First Options (involving the default allocation of
authority between courts and arbitrators), Howsam (involving the
allocation of authority to decide whether limitations periods have
lapsed), Cardegna (involving the default allocation of authority to
decide legality challenges to the underlying contract) and Bazzle (like
Stolt-Nielsen, involving an agreement that was silent about the
33
availability of class arbitration) fall into this category. We return to
these themes in Parts II and III. For now, we simply wish to lay out how
doctrinal evolutions enabled these current battles over procedure by
contract. In the remainder of this Section, we show empirically how
parties are exercising this freedom and also consider explanations for
why parties sometimes fail to do so.
B. Trends
The preceding subsection explained how the Court’s doctrine has
evolved so as to create conditions under which parties could—and,
34
indeed, had an incentive to—control procedure by contract. Here, we
examine the extent to which parties have responded to those
35
incentives.
Our hypothesis is that over time, arbitration clauses,
31. Expanded review, however, unlike the other issues, is new only in the form it takes—
i.e., clauses drafted specifying the grounds courts were to apply in reviewing arbitration
awards. An alternative form of expanded review—restricting the arbitrators’ authority to
make errors of law—has been around for a long time, and, indeed, predates enactment of the
FAA. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 905, 914–15 (2010).
32. See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008); Green Tree
Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 29–33 (1991).
33. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S.
79, 83 (2002); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
34. For an explanation of why parties choose arbitration as an option generally, see
generally Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549 (2003);
Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433 (2010); Richard A. Posner, The
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2005).
35. During oral argument in Bazzle, Justice Stevens predicted that the Court’s view on
an arbitrator’s authority to order class arbitration lacked “any real future significance,
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particularly in contracts between sophisticated and unsophisticated
parties, have become more complex, seeking to regulate the procedure
in arbitration in more and more detail.
The empirical evidence tracking changes in arbitration clauses over
time is limited. Most studies examine the provisions of arbitration
clauses at a particular point in time, rather than measuring changes in
those provisions over time. One exception is data on the terms of
arbitration clauses in franchise agreements in 1999 and 2007, as reported
36
by Drahozal and Wittrock. The sample consists of 28 form franchise
agreements, filed by franchisors with the Minnesota Department of
Commerce and collected in 1999 and 2007, that included an arbitration
clause in both years. A clear advantage of the dataset is that it examines
the same franchisors in each year, enabling a comparison of changes in
the arbitration clauses over time.
Franchise agreements, of course, are only one type of contract, and
they are not necessarily representative of other types of contracts, such
as, for example, employment, consumer, and business contracts. Thus,
franchisees, unlike consumers and most employees, are running
businesses, albeit often (although not always) small businesses.
Conversely, franchise agreements typically are standard form contracts
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis—i.e., are not fully negotiable
between the franchisor and the franchisee. Moreover, the timing of the
dataset is not perfect. We would expect to see the move to more
detailed arbitration clauses to have begun before 1999, so if anything
our results likely understate the degree of change in terms. With those
37
qualifications, Table 1 summarizes the results.

because isn’t it fairly clear that all the arbitration agreements in the future will prohibit class
actions?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444
(2003) (No. 02-634). In fact, the empirical results of our research suggest that, more broadly,
this sort of procedural contracting was already well underway by the time of Bazzle, but that,
conversely, it has not become ubiquitous, as Stevens suggested.
36. Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?
37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 90–94 (2008).
37. Id. at 103 tbl.8, 104 tbl.9, 106 tbl.10, 108 tbl.11, 110 tbl.12, 111 tbl.13, 112 tbl.14, 113
tbl.15. Bold type highlights those types of contract provisions that are more common in 2007
than in 1999.
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Table 1. Percentage of Franchise Agreements that Include Specified
Provisions in Arbitration Clauses (n=28)
1999
2007
Number of arbitrators
Discovery
Judicial review
Class arbitration or consolidation
Location
Costs
Time limits for filing claims
Restrictions on punitive damages

50.0%
21.4%
10.7%
64.3%
96.4%
75.0%
42.9%
75.0%

60.7%
21.4%
10.7%
89.3%
96.4%
85.7%
67.9%
85.7%

Table 1 illustrates several important findings:
Dispute resolution clauses in the franchise agreements in the sample
have become more detailed. Tellingly, in no procedural category did we
see a decline in the percentage of arbitration agreements regulating the
matter. This is consistent with our hypothesis that this current era of
contract and procedure has enhanced opportunities for sophisticated
parties to regulate the procedures by which disputes are settled.
The greatest increase in procedural terms comes in the use of classarbitration waivers and time limits. This suggests that control over those
mechanisms has grown in importance to the franchisor community,
which tracks what we’ve seen in the business community’s views of class
actions more generally over the last several decades. More modest
increases are seen in provisions controlling the allocation of costs and
awards of punitive damages, which were among the more important
advantages of arbitration to businesses immediately following the
decline of the non-arbitrability era.
Some provisions such as discovery limits are more static over time.
This is curious because reduced discovery is often cited as among the
38
more appealing features of arbitration.
So why might this occur?
Several preliminary hypotheses are possible.
One reason may simply be ignorance. Until parties become
accustomed to the opportunities enabled by arbitration clauses, they
may have little incentive to invest in sophisticated forms.
38. See Rutledge, supra note 26, at 575.
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Another reason may be fear of non-enforceability. With growing
reliance on unconscionability (and other) doctrines as a tool for resisting
enforcement of arbitration clauses, parties favoring arbitration may be
reluctant to build too many procedural advantages into an arbitration
39
clause for fear of jeopardizing its enforceability.
A third reason may be incomplete information. At the time parties
draft (and enter into) arbitration agreements, they may be unable to
predict with sufficient certainty the expected course of a dispute.
Consequently, they may be reluctant to tie their hands over the
availability (or unavailability) of a particular procedural right, for fear
that in a particular dispute they indeed may want access to that right.
A fourth, slightly more cynical reason may be principal-agent
problems. Lawyers drafting arbitration clauses on behalf of their clients
may have an incentive to leave certain procedural terms (like discovery)
40
vague. The advantage from the agent’s perspective is that the vague
term creates the conditions in which disputes over gap-filling inevitably
will arise. Those disputes translate into increased fees for the attorney.
The difficulty with this explanation, it must be noted, is that it is difficult
to explain the variation across procedural terms—by logic of this
argument, the attorney would have the incentive to leave other terms
(like class arbitration) unresolved as well, yet the evidence suggests they
have not done so.
A final reason may be transaction costs. To the extent parties have
equal (or approximately equal) sophistication, more detailed procedural
contracts potentially become more costly, as each party has a negotiable
stake in the bargain. Consistent with the literature on incompletely
41
theorized agreements, one would expect more detailed arbitration
clauses where relatively significant differences in bargaining positions
exist and relatively less detailed clauses among parties with similar
bargaining positions. In Scott and Triantis’s terms, the negotiation of
procedural contracts between parties of relatively equal bargaining

39. Where courts find an arbitration clause unenforceable on these grounds, that
determination raises a corollary question whether the offending provision is severable or,
instead, the entire arbitration clause is invalid. See Miller, supra note 7, at 379–80. For a
good example of severability analysis, see Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
40. This hypothesis presupposes, of course, that an outside counsel either drafted the
clause or was consulted by the company about how best to draft the clause. The database
does not permit independent verification of this premise.
41. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1733 (1995).
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power entails relatively greater “front-end costs as transaction costs”
than procedural contracts between parties of relatively unequal
42
bargaining power.
It bears emphasis that each of the foregoing
explanations merely amounts to a hypothesis. The available data do not
permit a firm testing of the various hypotheses.
This Part has examined both the history of procedural contracts and
the empirical record. The history demonstrates that the demise of the
non-arbitrability doctrine has created unprecedented opportunities for
parties to regulate procedural rights on a pre-dispute basis. It has given
them an incentive to design far more elaborate procedural contracts
than during the era when only garden-variety contract claims were
arbitrable. The empirical record provides evidence that at least some
parties are increasingly exercising their procedural contractual freedom
to enter into elaborate agreements regulating the procedure by which
their dispute will be resolved. Over time, the most significant
movement has been an increase in the use of class-arbitration waivers
and contractual limitations periods. Curiously though, discovery has
consistently been left unregulated, despite the potential for parties to
control the costs of discovery through contractual terms. While several
possible hypotheses might explain this curious phenomenon, the
necessary data are not yet available to test them. This remains a fertile
area for future research.
III. WHEN THE PROCEDURAL CONTRACT SPEAKS—
LIMITS ON FREEDOM
This Part addresses the scope and limits of parties’ procedural
43
contractual freedom, the issue at the core of Rent-A-Center. After
laying out the particular contract term at issue in Rent-A-Center—one
that allocated to the arbitrator the exclusive authority to resolve
challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement
(hereinafter a “delegation provision”)—it canvasses several data sources
to determine how frequently parties use delegation provisions. It then
takes another cut at the data to examine how parties might achieve the
same results as a delegation provision, but through indirect means. This
Part then turns to the normative question at the core of Rent-ACenter—namely the limits on the parties’ ability to exercise their
procedural contractual freedom. After introducing several potential
42. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 7, at 823.
43. We disclose that one of us (Drahozal) provided comments on a draft of the
arbitration scholars’ brief in Rent-A-Center, but was not a party to the brief.
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models of regulation, we defend an approach that relies on a blend of
industry self-regulation (through the use of tools like the due process
protocols) and case-by-case judicial oversight. This Part concludes by
anticipating and responding to several potential criticisms of this
approach.
A. Procedural Contractual Freedom: The Case of Delegation Clauses
The facts of Rent-A-Center illustrate well our point about how
sophisticated parties utilize arbitration clauses to control procedures by
contract.
In that case, Rent-A-Center required its prospective
employees, as a condition of employment, to sign a separate five-page
arbitration agreement. Among other things, that five-page agreement
required the parties to split the arbitration fees and limited the parties’
44
ability to conduct discovery. It also allocated to the arbitrator the
“exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation,
applicability, enforceability or formation of [the arbitration agreement]
including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of [the
45
arbitration agreement] is void or voidable.”
This last provision was central to the question before the Supreme
Court. In light of this provision, who resolved challenges to the
unconscionability of the arbitration agreement? The arbitrator or the
court?
The answer might have turned on a straightforward
interpretation of First Options—specifically, whether the quoted
provision provided the necessary evidence of “clear and unmistakable”
intent to allocate the decision to the arbitrator.
While the dissent answered this question with an unambiguous
46
“no,” the majority constructed an entirely novel and unanticipated
theory to resolve the case—one neither advanced by the parties nor
considered by the courts below. Instead of simply answering the
question “yes,” the majority reconceptualized the arbitration
agreement. Rather than treating the arbitration agreement as a single
procedural contract, it described the agreement as embodying two
separate contracts—(1) a contract to arbitrate the parties’ substantive
claims (that is, those arising out of the employment relationship) (“the
arbitration agreement”) and (2) a separate procedural contract to
allocate to the arbitrator the power to resolve challenges to the
arbitration agreement (dubbed “the delegation provision” by the
44. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2780 (2010).
45. Id. at 2775.
46. Id. at 2784 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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majority). In the majority’s view, since Jackson’s unconscionability
challenge was directed only at the first contract (the arbitration
agreement) and not the second, the challenge was appropriately
47
resolved by the arbitrator, not the court.
This conclusion marked a significant expansion of the “separability”
principle—a principle first announced by the Court in Prima Paint and
one that has become a cornerstone of arbitration, both domestically and
48
internationally.
As formulated by Prima Paint over four decades
earlier, the separability doctrine treats an arbitration clause as a
separate contract from the main contract that includes the arbitration
clause. Separability permitted the development of a default rule for
allocation of authority. Under that default rule, courts resolve
challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements and
arbitrators resolve challenges to the enforceability of the underlying
49
substantive contract.
Rent-A-Center extended the separability
principle by treating the arbitration agreement itself as entailing two
separate contracts. This double separability principle enabled a further
allocation of power to the arbitrator—now arbitrators could resolve
challenges to the arbitration agreement, and courts retained only the
competence to resolve challenges directed specifically at the delegation
provision.
This extension of the separability doctrine marks a substantial
development toward a model of arbitration that allows parties a great
deal of procedural contractual freedom (and a concomitant reduction in
a court’s role to police procedural contracts). While the facts of Rent-ACenter are somewhat unusual (as the case involves a separate, detailed
arbitration agreement), the decision logically extends to a case where
the arbitration agreement is merely a clause within a broader contract
(as is often the case, for example, in franchise or consumer credit
agreements). The case thus gives rise to the possibility that a single
document qua agreement will be legally understood to contain at least
three separate contracts: (1) the underlying substantive commitments

47. Id. at 2779 (majority opinion).
48. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967); see
also Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know about “Separability” in Seventeen
Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 81 & n.193 (2003) (stating that “every
modern regime of arbitration—if not indeed every piece of legislation in the civilized world—
takes separability as the foundation stone of the entire structure,” although recognizing
limited exceptions).
49. This statement of the rule is subject to an important qualification. See infra note 50
and accompanying text.
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(for example, a cell phone for a monthly fee); (2) a bilateral
commitment to arbitrate; and (3) a bilateral commitment to arbitrate
challenges to contract (2). Only if a challenge were directed at contract
(3) could a party resisting arbitration seek refuge in court (subject to an
50
important qualification).
That is the potential impact of Rent-A-Center. Whether that impact
is widely felt, of course, depends on the frequency with which parties
employ such clauses. So we sought to ascertain how often contracts, like
the Rent-A-Center contract, attempt to allocate competence over
challenges to the arbitration agreement exclusively to the arbitrator.
To test this proposition about Rent-A-Center’s impact, we consulted
51
three datasets. The first was the franchise dataset, discussed above.
The second consisted of arbitration clauses collected from a 2008 sample
of joint venture agreements (both domestic and international),
52
submitted as attachments to SEC filings. The third was derived from a
new database of credit card contracts made available by the Federal
Reserve Board pursuant to the Credit Card Accountability
53
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009. Table 2 summarizes our
findings:

50. Here’s the important qualification: if the party challenging the agreement alleges
that the parties never formed any of the agreements (for example, due to lack of assent), the
court would resolve that jurisdictional issue. See Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 130 S. Ct.
2847, 2860 (2010).
51. Data on delegation clauses were not included in the published version of the study.
We reviewed the arbitration clauses used in the study for the presence of delegation clauses.
52. For further description of the dataset, see Drahozal & Ware, supra note 34, at 465–
66 & n.143. Again, data on delegation clauses were not included in the published version of
the study, but were, instead, obtained from a review of the arbitration clauses used in the
study.
53. Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 204, 123 Stat. 1734, 1746 (2009) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1632);
see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.58(c)(2) (2010). The sample we use in this article consists of all credit
card agreements that included arbitration clauses as of December 31, 2009, which were
submitted by issuers to the Federal Reserve and made available on the Federal Reserve web
page as of September 1, 2010. A total of 65 issuers — banks, thrifts, credit unions, and several
nonfinancial businesses (retailers that offer credit to their customers) — submitted credit card
agreements with arbitration clauses, including the largest credit card issuers that at the time
were using arbitration clauses. For our purposes here, we do not distinguish among the
different types of issuers.
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Table 2. Delegation Clauses in Arbitration Clauses, by Type of Contract
No
AntiClass
Type of
Delegation
Delegation
Delegation
Exception
Contract
Clause
Clause
Clause
Franchise
Agreements
4 (14.3%)
2 (7.1%)
0 (0.0%)
22 (78.6%)
(2007)
Joint Venture
Agreements 1 (11.1%)
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
8 (88.9%)
Domestic
(2008)
Joint Venture
Agreements 1 (5.0%)
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
19 (95.0%)
International
(2008)
Credit Card
Contracts
31 (49.2%)
6 (9.5%)
20 (31.7%)
6 (9.5%)
(2009)

The findings in Table 2 indicate (not surprisingly) that the use of
54
express delegation clauses varies with the type of contract. They are
rarely used in joint venture agreements and used slightly more
55
frequently in franchise agreements. In both instances, though, such
clauses appear only in a handful of contracts. By contrast, delegation
clauses appear far more frequently (31 of 63, or 49.2%) in the credit
card agreements with arbitration clauses gathered from the Federal
Reserve database.
Notably, just under ten percent of the credit card arbitration
agreements (and just over seven percent of the franchise arbitration
agreements) include what we call an “anti-delegation clause”—a
provision that reserves decision on the enforceability of the arbitration

54. In addition, the delegation clauses themselves varied. By no means did all of the
clauses include language as clear and definitive as the language in the Rent-A-Center clause.
Note also that the terms of the arbitration agreement were missing for two of the credit card
contracts in the sample which otherwise indicated that disputes were subject to arbitration.
As a result, those agreements are not included in the results reported in Table 2.
55. An additional six of the twenty-eight franchise arbitration clauses included language
stating that the parties agreed to arbitrate claims that the entire franchise agreement or any
provision thereof was invalid. Because those provisions did not specifically refer to the
arbitration clause, we did not classify them as delegation clauses.
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56

clause to the court rather than the arbitrators. In addition, over thirty
percent of the credit card arbitration agreements (but none of the
franchise arbitration agreements) reserved decisions on the validity of
57
any class-arbitration waiver for the court.
We suspect that the
motivation for these clauses is the desire to preserve the opportunity for
immediate, de novo review in the event of an adverse decision
(something that a party would not receive if the matter were delegated
to the arbitrator). But regardless, such provisions do provide some
reason to believe that Rent-A-Center will not result in all businesses
including delegation clauses in their consumer and employment
58
arbitration clauses.
It is important to stress the limits of the data. We do not have data
on employment contracts—the type of contract at issue in Rent-ACenter—and we do not claim that our results are representative of all
types of contracts. Moreover, the data on some of the types of contracts
may be out-of-date. The most recent data we examined (for credit card
contracts, as of December 31, 2009), also have the greatest usage of
delegation clauses, which may provide some evidence of a trend toward
greater use of such clauses (or which may simply reflect a greater usage
of delegation clauses in credit card agreements).
Express clauses are not the only means by which parties might
reallocate from courts to arbitrators the power to rule on jurisdictional
challenges. Another, potentially more important, means would be
through incorporation of institutional rules (like the rules of the
American Arbitration Association). Such rules often contain language
that authorizes the arbitrator to rule on jurisdictional challenges. Rule
7(a) of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules is exemplary: “The
arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction,
56. For example, the arbitration clause for the Merrick Bank credit cardholder
agreement provided that “[a]ny claim, dispute or controversy (“Claim”) by either you or us
against the other arising from or relating in any way to the Agreement or your Account,
except for the validity, scope or enforceability of this Arbitration Agreement, shall, at the
demand of any party, be resolved by binding arbitration.” Merrick Bank, Merrick Bank Visa
or MasterCard Cardholder Agreement ¶ 22 (Dec. 31, 2009) (copy on file with authors).
57. For example, the arbitration clause in the M&I Federal Savings Bank credit
cardholder agreement provided that “[a] court with proper jurisdiction and not an arbitrator
will determine whether this provision prohibiting class actions, joinder and/or consolidation is
valid and effective.” M&I Bank, M&I Bank FSB Pricing Information Addendum ¶ 24 (Dec.
31, 2009) (copy on file with authors).
58. For different views, see Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, supra note 7, at 46
(“[D]elegation clauses have already become fixtures in consumer and employment
contracts.”); Stipanowich, supra note 20, at 20 (“In fact, agreements to delegate ‘gateway’
functions to arbitrators are ubiquitous in business contracts.”).
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including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity
59
of the arbitration agreement.”
Incorporated rules like Rule 7(a) differ from the contract provision
in Rent-A-Center in one potentially critical respect. Unlike the contract
in Rent-A-Center, these rules do not affirmatively exclude the
jurisdiction of courts over the arbitrability challenge. This raises the
question whether an incorporated rule such as AAA Rule 7(a) supplies
the necessary “‘clear[] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence” of the parties’
60
intent to allocate jurisdictional challenges to the arbitration.
Opinions differ on this point. Federal appellate courts have
overwhelmingly concluded that such language satisfies the First Options
standard and, thereby, strips the court of an up-front authority to rule
61
on a challenge to the arbitration clause.
In contrast, the recent
Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of International Commercial
Arbitration has taken the opposite view, concluding that, to satisfy First
Options, the contract (or institutional rule) must use language
designating that the arbitrator’s jurisdiction over such challenges is
62
exclusive. Under the Restatement view, the Rent-A-Center language
suffices; institutional rules such as AAA Rule 7(a), as presently phrased,
do not.
We do not seek here to resolve that doctrinal quibble. Instead, on
the assumption that the federal appellate courts state the prevailing law
at present, we again consulted the various contract datasets to ascertain
how frequently parties are incorporating institutional rules into their
arbitration agreements. Table 3 summarizes our findings:

59. American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures, Rule R-7(a) (June 1, 2009), available at www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440.
60. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (quoting
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
61. See, e.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005);
Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2005); FSC
Secs. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312–13 (8th Cir. 1994); Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886
F.2d 469, 472–73 (1st Cir. 1989).
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 5-10 cmt. e & reporter’s note e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2010). Professor
Drahozal is an Associate Reporter for the Restatement. The views stated in this article
reflect his personal views and should not be attributed to the other Reporters or the
American Law Institute.
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Table 3. Arbitration Provider Specified in Arbitration Clauses,
by Type of Contract
Type of Contract
Provider
AAA – 20 (30.8%)
JAMS – 2 (3.1%)
63
Credit Card (2009)
NAF – 7 (10.8%)
64
Choice of Provider – 32 (49.2%)
None or missing – 4 (6.2%)
AAA – 24 (85.7%)
Franchise Agreements
JAMS – 1 (3.6%)
65
(2007)
Choice among providers – 3 (10.7%)
Joint Venture
AAA – 8 (88.9%)
Agreements - Domestic
AAA/ICDR – 1 (11.1%)
(2008)
AAA – 2 (10.0%)
CIETAC – 4 (20.0%)
FETACC – 3 (15.0%)
HKIAC – 2 (10.0%)
Joint Venture
IAA – 2 (10.0%)
Agreements ICC – 1 (5.0%)
66
International (2008)
SIAC – 1 (5.0%)
SIAC (UNTIRAL Rules) – 1 (5.0%)
Ad hoc (UNCITRAL Rules) – 1 (5.0%)
Ad hoc – 3 (15.0%)

63. In July 2009, the NAF discontinued administering new consumer arbitrations, as part
of the settlement of a consumer fraud lawsuit brought by the Minnesota Attorney General.
Consent Judgment para. 3, Minnesota v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550
(Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009), available at http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.
pdf. Shortly thereafter, the American Arbitration Association announced a moratorium on
its administration of many (albeit not all) debt collection arbitrations brought by businesses
against consumers (but not claims brought by consumers against businesses arising out of the
same contracts). American Arbitration Association, Notice on Consumer Debt Collection
Arbitrations, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=36427 (last visited May 16, 2011).
64. Of the 32 clauses that listed a choice of providers, 29 (or 90.6%) included the
American Arbitration Association as an option. In addition, the other major arbitral
institutions administering these sorts of arbitrations (JAMS and NAF) both have provisions
in their rules similar to AAA Rule 7(a). Thus, the effect of Rent-A-Center on the allocation
question potentially will be quite profound.
65. Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 36, at 101 tbl.7.
66. Key to the abbreviations in Table 3: AAA – American Arbitration Association;
CIETAC – China International Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission; FETACC –
Foreign Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission of China; HKIAC – Hong Kong
International Arbitration Centre; IAA – International Arbitration Association; ICC –
International Chamber of Commerce; SIAC – Singapore International Arbitration Center;
SIAC (UNCITRAL) – administered by Singapore International Arbitration Centre under
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Ad hoc (UNCITRAL) – non-administered arbitration
subject to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Ad hoc – non-administered arbitration subject
to various national laws.
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As shown in Table 3, the AAA is the most common provider
specified in domestic arbitration agreements in the United States. A
wider array of providers (not surprisingly) is specified in international
arbitration agreements; most, however, have a rule like Rule 7(a) of the
AAA Commercial Rules. Thus, to the extent that courts construe the
language in the AAA rules consistently with the delegation clause in
Rent-A-Center, the decision is likely to have far-reaching effects, even
without the need for parties to revise their arbitration clauses. To be
clear, however, it will only have those effects in cases in which the
parties incorporate institutional rules in their arbitration clauses and do
not address the delegation issue specifically in their clause. If the parties
address the issue, either by expanding or contracting the scope of the
arbitrators’ authority, the delegation (or anti-delegation) provision will
govern rather than the institutional rules.
Based on the growing use of detailed arbitration clauses, we
anticipate two developments in the wake of Rent-A-Center. First, we
expect to see an increased use of detailed delegation clauses such as
those at issue in Rent-A-Center (in order to avoid the doctrinal question
that divides the federal courts from the Restatement), particularly in
contracts between sophisticated and unsophisticated parties. But we do
not expect delegation clauses to become ubiquitous, given that some
sophisticated parties seem to prefer to have courts rather than
arbitrators rule on the validity of the arbitration agreement. Second, we
expect that opponents of arbitration will seek to develop a jurisprudence
attacking the delegation clause (as opposed to the underlying arbitration
clause). After Rent-A-Center, attacks on that clause remain the only
issue unquestionably within the court’s domain where parties have
delegated to the arbitrator the power to rule on the enforceability of the
67
arbitration agreement.
B. Procedural Contractual Freedom: Limits
Rent-A-Center raises important normative questions extending far
beyond the narrow issues involving delegation clauses. At a broad level
of generality, the case concerns the extent to which the law constrains
parties’ ability to contract freely for the procedures governing their
dispute. Much has been written on the general limits of contractual

67. See Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, supra note 7, at 30 (“[P]laintiffs may never be
able to prove that a delegation clause is unconscionable. . . . [O]ther than [a handful of]
unlikely scenarios, any claim that a delegation clause is unconscionable comes perilously close
to being a non-sequitur.”).
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freedom, and we do not re-plow that familiar ground. Instead, we
examine several possible regulatory models and defend a model that
involves a blend of industry self-regulation and case-by-case judicial
oversight.
1. Industry Self-Regulation
Like many industries, the dispute resolution industry is theoretically
capable of self-regulation. In the context of procedures and contract,
this self-regulation has taken the form of due process protocols. The
68
protocols and their history have been amply discussed elsewhere, so we
summarize them here only to the extent necessary to advance our thesis.
The protocols signify a commitment by certain arbitral institutions
(such as the American Arbitration Association and JAMS) that they
will only administer arbitrations in certain fields (such as employment,
consumer, and health care) if the parties ensure that a minimum set of
procedural “rights” are observed. As Paul Verkuil has observed, the
choice of terminology (“due process protocol”) is an odd one in light of
the conclusion that arbitration does not constitute state action and, as a
strictly doctrinal matter, is not subject to constitutional requirements of
69
due process.
Nonetheless, the protocols function in a manner not
unlike rules of procedural due process, setting forth a series of norms
that must be observed in a decision-making process before the results of
70
that process will be legally enforceable. The due process protocol for
employment disputes exemplifies the sorts of rights guaranteed to the
employee:
 the employee has the right to be represented by a person of
her own choosing;
 the employer is encouraged to pay at least a share of the
employee’s fees;
68. Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty
Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 165,
168–174 (2005); Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369, 390–91 (2004); Arnold M. Zack, Arbitration as a Tool to Unclog
Government and the Judiciary: The Due Process Protocol as an International Model, 7
WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 10 passim (1996); Searle Civil Justice Institute, Consumer
Arbitration Before the American Arbitration Association 16–24 (Mar. 2009) (copy on file
with authors) [hereinafter Searle Study].
69. Paul R. Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 985 (2005).
70. The content of some of the protections finds its roots in procedural protections
attendant to labor-management arbitrations under collective bargaining agreements. See
Harding, supra note 68, at 395–96.
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 employees should have access to all information reasonably
relevant to their claims;
 before selecting an arbitrator, parties should have sufficient
information to contact parties who previously have appeared
before her;
 arbitrators should have sufficient skill and knowledge;
 arbitrators should be drawn from a diverse background;
 arbitrators should be free of any relationships that would
create an actual or apparent conflict of interest;
 the employee is entitled to the same array of remedies in
arbitration as she would be entitled to in a judicial
71
proceeding.
In this regard, the protocols function as a type of industry-imposed
constraint on parties’ freedom to enter into procedural contracts.
2. Judicial Oversight
Courts can also regulate the parties’ procedural contractual
72
freedom. Doctrinally, they do this in several ways. First, they can rely
73
on Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court has
interpreted Section 2 to mean that courts can refuse to enforce
arbitration agreements on the basis of generally applicable contract
74
defenses (like fraud, duress, and unconscionability).
Second, with
respect to federal statutory claims at least, they can declare that that an
arbitral system is inadequate to permit vindication of a party’s statutory
rights (for example, by holding that an arbitration clause with a fee75
shifting provision deters vindication of a statutory right). Finally, they
71. American Arbitration Association, Employment Due Process Protocol (May 9,
1995), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535.
72. See Lampley, supra note 12 passim.
73. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
74. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010).
75. This ground traces to the Court’s decision in Gilmer. While the Court in Gilmer
dismissed a host of broad-based procedural attacks on the arbitral process (on matters like
arbitrator bias, insufficient discovery, the lack of a written opinion and insufficient remedial
powers), it left the door ajar for a more targeted attack on procedures in arbitration. In a
statement that would set the stage for the current battles over contract and procedure, the
Court, quoting its prior decision in Mitsubishi, opined that “so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the
statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.” Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)). Logically, this statement implied
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can rely on various doctrines allowing them to vacate (or refuse to
enforce) arbitral awards on the basis of some procedural defect in the
arbitration (for example, by refusing to enforce an arbitral award when
76
the arbitrators acted with “evident partiality”).
3. Statutory Regulation
77

Legislatures can regulate parties’ procedural contracts.
Such
regulation might take various forms. One form would be to declare
certain disputes non-arbitrable, as Congress previously has done in
certain specialized industries such as automobile dealer agreements,
consumer financial services contracts with military personnel, poultry
wholesale contracts (providing a statutory opt-out from arbitration
clauses), employment agreements of defense contractors and most
recently, residential mortgages and whistleblower claims in the
78
commodities industry. The previously mentioned Arbitration Fairness
Act would broadly adopt this approach by making pre-dispute
arbitration agreements unenforceable in consumer and employment
79
agreements. Though not aimed directly at procedural contracts, such
legislative action has the indirect effect of constraining parties’
procedural contractual freedom by restoring elements of the second era
80
of contract and procedure. Another form would be to condition the
enforcement of arbitral awards on adherence to certain procedures.
Section 10 of the FAA does this to a degree by providing that an arbitral
that when an arbitral forum deprived a litigant of her ability effectively to vindicate her
statutory causes of action, that defect could render the arbitration clause unenforceable. For
a thoughtful argument that the Court should reorient these categories, see Hiro N. Aragaki,
Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1716439.
76. See 9 U.S.C. § 10.
77. For a spirited defense of this approach, see Miller, supra note 7, at 404–09. See also
Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, supra note 7, at 43–46 (defending congressional control
over the enforceability of forum selection clauses); Horton, The Shadow Terms, supra note 7,
at 665–66 & n.364 (defending a legislative ban on unilateral amendments to arbitration
agreements).
78. See supra notes 4 & 5.
79. See supra note 24.
80. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 399–400 (2009) (noting the tension between the
Arbitration Fairness Act and freedom of contract principles); Alicia J. Surdyk, Note, On the
Continued Vitality of Securities Arbitration: Why Reform Efforts Must Not Preclude
Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1131, 1143 (2009/10) (“[A]t the most
fundamental level, the issue is that the cited provisions of the Arbitration Fairness Act are
diametrically opposed to the basic principles underlying the nature of a contractual
agreement, namely freedom of contract and certainty of contract.”).
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award can be vacated for procedural misconduct by the arbitrator that
81
prejudices a party’s rights, as noted above. Finally, a legislature might
provide that an arbitration agreement will not be enforceable unless the
agreement ensures that certain procedures are observed in the
arbitration. So far, Congress has not moved in this direction, although it
has considered bills such as the Fair Arbitration Act of 2007 that would
82
have had such an effect.
4. Administrative Regulation
As an alternative to direct statutory language, legislatures can vest
administrative agencies with the authority to oversee arbitration
agreements and the procedural choices contained therein. In the
securities industry, this already occurs to a degree: the Securities and
Exchange Commission oversees the development of rules governing
83
disputes in certain investor and employment agreements. Portions of
the recently enacted financial reform law embrace this model. That
legislation expands the SEC’s authority over arbitration agreements and
authorizes it to adopt rules banning or regulating the use of arbitration
84
clauses in investment advisory contracts.
It also vests the new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with the authority to promulgate
rules regulating the content of arbitration agreements in certain
consumer finance contracts (like credit card agreements) and, if
85
appropriate, to prohibit those agreements entirely.

81. 9 U.S.C. § 10(c).
82. See Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007). Along similar lines,
the American Arbitration Association has proposed codification of the Due Process
Protocols. See The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the Subcomm.
on the Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 11–12 (2007) (statement of
Richard Naimark, Senior Vice President, American Arbitration Association), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate_hearings&docid=f:42
605.pdf.
83. See Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities
Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 495 (2008); Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to
Securities ADR, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 413, 420–24 (2006).
84. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 921(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
85. Id. § 1028, 124 Stat. 2003–04.
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5. What’s the Optimal Approach?
In our view, a blend of industry self-regulation and judicial oversight
likely is optimal, at least based on a cost-benefit calculation. Here’s
why:
First, private regulation can reduce transaction costs. A familiar
literature in political science has documented the difficulties of enacting
legislation due to the multiple decision points where legislative action
86
may fail (committee, floor vote, conference committee, veto). The
protocols avoid these impediments to action by involving a single
decision point, namely voluntary assent by the associations themselves.
Due to the reduced number of decision points, they are also more easily
87
changed and adapted to evolving circumstances.
Administrative
regulation avoids some of these barriers but, of course, presupposes a
degree of legislative authorization which may be difficult to obtain.
Second, private regulation can offer greater comprehensiveness. In
contrast to judicial regulation, private regulation and certain forms of
public regulation (both legislative and administrative) can be more
comprehensive and more nuanced. Drafters of the protocols can
consider the gamut of available data and experience. By contrast,
judicial regulators may be constrained by the record evidence offered by
the parties.
Third, private regulation is more easily tailored to differing
circumstances. Compared to all three forms of public regulation
(judicial, legislative, and administrative), the protocol mechanism allows
its drafters to tailor the protocols to the particular needs of the regulated
industry, as exemplified by the substantive differences between the
protocols for employment, consumer, and health care arbitrations. By
contrast, the scope of any judicial regulation may be constrained by
doctrines such as standing, bars against advisory opinions, and limits on
the remedial powers of courts. And legislation that treats all consumer
and employment contracts identically (such as by making pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in those contracts unenforceable) fails to
88
consider that not all arbitration is alike.

86. See generally R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
(1990); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed.
2003).
87. See Harding, supra note 68, at 369–73.
88. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA
Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 918 (2010) (“These variations
suggest the need for a nuanced approach to public policy concerning arbitration.”).
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Judicial oversight facilitates this process of adaptation. A rich
scholarship has focused the various “feedback loops” between private
89
and public actors in the development of legal norms. The protocols
provide courts a workable benchmark by which to evaluate the fairness
of other procedures; moreover, hammered out through dialogue
between the industry and advocates for employees and consumers, they
arguably offer a relatively balanced metric rather than a biased one.
Forged through this process, the protocols stimulate a dialogue between
courts and the arbitration industry. For example, in Cole v. Burns
International Security Services, Chief Judge Edwards expressed his
disagreement with the employment protocol’s cost-sharing provisions,
which sparked a lively debate over whether the protocol or some other
approach should be used to ensure the affordability of arbitration for
90
employees with statutory claims. Just as the protocols can influence
judicial understanding of fair arbitral procedures, judicial critique can
91
suggest reform pathways to the protocols’ developers.
Fourth, private regulation enhances opportunities for participation
by interested groups (or policy entrepreneurs acting on their behalf).
As Margaret Harding has observed, the protocol process holds forth the
92
potential for greater participation by interested groups.
Whereas
access limitations or standing doctrines may limit groups’ ability to
influence the outcome of legislative or judicial regulation, the process of

89. See, e.g., Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and
the Use of Norms as Private Regulation, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1, 24–30 (2005). See generally Eric
A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996) (discussing “insulation theory” of nonlegal
sanctions).
90. 105 F.3d 1465, 1483–1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997). For exemplary literature on the costsharing debate, see, for example, Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an
Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory
Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2002); R. Brian Tipton, Allocating the Costs
of Arbitrating Statutory Claims Under the Federal Arbitration Act: An Unresolved Issue, 26
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 325 (2002). The July 2002 issue of the University of Miami Law
Review dedicated an entire symposium to the issue of arbitration cost allocation in the wake
of Green Tree Financial.
91. This consideration favors industry promulgation of the protocols instead of
codification of the Due Process Protocols, as some have proposed. See supra note 82. While
codification of the protocols could accomplish several of the same ends (and avoid any
ambiguity over their legal status, see infra note 107), ultimately we fear that a legislative
solution would be too blunt and inflexible an instrument. Given the difficulties in enacting
legislation, it would be more difficult to amend or modify the codified protocols than it would
be to adjust them through the private revisions, something that arbitral institutions do
regularly with their own rules.
92. Harding, supra note 68, at 371.
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protocol development and acceptance suffers from no such inherent
limitations. To be sure, the validity of this premise depends on the
extent to which the protocols’ developers choose to include various
groups in the development process.
While we have offered a variety of reasons that support a regulatory
approach based on private regulation combined with judicial oversight,
we acknowledge several potential criticisms of that approach and
address the most significant ones here.
93
First, our proposed approach might prompt a “race to the bottom.”
In other words, competition among providers might prompt them to
skew their procedural standards in order to cater to the needs of the
dominant business interest much like certain states have diluted their
standards on matters like corporate law or usury law in order to attract
94
corporate investment. Indeed, some arbitral institutions have been
95
severely criticized for doing precisely this.
However, we believe this criticism overlooks a powerful counterincentive—namely the bond of the arbitrator and the arbitral
96
institution. Recall that arbitral awards ultimately are subject to judicial
97
This judicial
oversight in vacatur and enforcement proceedings.
scrutiny provides a compelling counterweight to any incentive that
otherwise might incline the arbitrator to favor the repeat player or the
98
party in the superior bargaining position. An arbitrator (or institution)
whose awards are routinely set aside will not be in the business for long
because neither party has an incentive to invest in a decision maker
93. See Horton, The Shadow Terms, supra note 7, at 637–38.
94. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 33, 109–13 (2009).
Whether there is in fact a “race to the bottom” in corporate law is hotly debated. Id. at 245
n.1.
95. See, e.g., JOHN O’DONNELL ET. AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP:
HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 1–13 (2007) (addressing the
National Arbitration Forum).
96. See Stephen J. Choi, The Problem with Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1233, 1235–37 (2003).
97. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006); Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 5, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 38. In addition, the arbitration agreements themselves are subject to court oversight
prior to the proceeding.
98. Empirical evidence supports this postulate. The available empirical evidence on the
“repeat player” effect is mixed at best. To the extent such an effect has been documented,
the prevailing view is that repeat players do better in arbitration not because the arbitrators
systematically favor them but, instead, because the repeat players’ experience enables them
to decide which cases to settle (where their adversary’s position is strong) and which to
contest (where their adversary’s position is weak). See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 88, at
908–16; Rutledge, supra note 26, at 565–67.
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whose decisions are likely to be invalidated. Thus, while we recognize
the intuitive appeal of the race-to-the-bottom argument, we are
99
disinclined to believe it has much bite in this context.
100
Second, private regulation might reduce transparency. Compared
to more regulatory forms of rule development, the protocols are not
developed according to any standardized methods by which they are
101
closely scrutinized.
In Gillian Metzger’s terms, the protocols lack
102
By contrast, for example,
adequate “accountability mechanisms.”
administrative regulation typically would undergo a formal notice-andcomment period followed often by judicial challenge to the
reasonableness of the agency’s regulation. Likewise, a process of
legislative regulation likely would create some sort of legislative record
that a court could scrutinize. This criticism is, in our view, overblown.
The history of the protocols’ development, thoroughly recounted by
scholars such as Margaret Harding and Richard Bales, demonstrates
that interested groups consistently had a seat at the table as the
103
protocols were developed.
Metzger’s complaint about the lack of
“accountability mechanisms” proves too much—for it would necessitate
public oversight of any project of private norm development—
something that would be both costly and unworkable.
Third, our proposed approach risks second-best outcomes. As
Carrie Menkel-Meadow has explained, private regulation may not
104
achieve as much substantively as direct regulation.
This stems from
the bargaining toward second-best solutions. For example, as Menkel99. In this regard, we part company with Carrington and Haagen, who contend that
arbitrators “are dependent for their careers, to a degree that no judges are, on the
acceptability of their awards to the parties, and perhaps especially on their acceptability to
parties who are ‘repeat players.’” Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 346. This account
overlooks the arbitrator’s more compelling incentive to develop and maintain a reputational
bond for rendering enforceable awards, irrespective of the identity of the prevailing party.
100. On the relationship between arbitration and democratic theory, see generally
Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (2004) (asking whether arbitration furthers the goals of democratic
governance).
101. On the defects in the decision-making process behind the protocols’ development,
see Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public Policy
Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173, 215–
22 (1998).
102. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1456–76
(2003).
103. See Bales, supra note 68, at 171–72; Harding, supra note 68, at 390–91.
104. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute
Resolution Processes: What’s Happening and What’s Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 949–951
(2002).

10. DRAHOZAL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1136

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

8/13/2011 9:23 PM

[94:1103

Meadow describes, advocates for the employment protocol necessarily
compromised on certain procedural protections in order to obtain the
assent of the various industry participants and arbitral institutions. As a
consequence of this second-best quality to the protocol-development
105
process, critics have called for strengthened protections. This criticism
is both too static and too platonic. It is static because it ignores the fact
that the protocols are capable of refinement. Merely because the
protocols might have resulted from some sort of compromise at a given
point in time does not preclude their refinement at some future point if
empirical evidence is put forth that undercuts the premise of a
compromise. It is too platonic because it presupposes that, at a given
point in time, the drafters of the protocols had the necessary
information to deduce the “right” answer to a given question of arbitral
procedure and that other regulators would necessarily do better. As we
have explained elsewhere, the empirical record on many questions of
106
arbitration is woefully incomplete; in light of that incomplete record, it
is simply not realistic to argue that the compromises embedded in the
protocols somehow shifted away from demonstrably correct approaches.
And the same limitation applies with perhaps greater force to public, as
opposed to private, regulatory mechanisms.
Finally, our approach might entail a lack of predictability.
Specifically, parties are unable to predict precisely how courts will use
the protocols. Some decisions, as noted above, cite the protocols as
merely indicative of a professional trend; by contrast, others come close
to saying that the failure of an arbitration proceeding to comport with
the protocols provides a legal reason for denying enforceability of the
arbitration agreement altogether. As Richard Bales has explained, the
due process protocols function as guideposts for both employers and the
107
judiciary but no longer provide predictable guidance.
This criticism is a fair one, at least in part. But it overlooks that the
protocols are enforced in the first instance by the institutions
themselves, which refuse to administer arbitrations under clauses that
108
fail to comply with the protocols. Court review is only a second-line
105. See, e.g., Bales, supra note 68, at 167; Harding, supra note 68, at 370–72, 417.
106. See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 88, at 845; Rutledge, supra note 26, at 576.
107. Bales, supra note 68, at 167; see also Martin H. Malin, Ethical Concerns in Drafting
Employment Arbitration Agreements After Circuit City and Green Tree, 41 BRANDEIS L.J.
779, 787–88 (2003).
108. The Searle Study found that “the AAA effectively reviews arbitration clauses for
protocol compliance and appropriately responds to clauses that do not comply.” See Searle
Study, supra note 68, at 83–100, 111.
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defense. As for the predictability of that court review, the best answer
that we can offer (which is not a complete one) is that case-by-case
judicial review will help give concrete legal content to the protocols over
time. As courts vacate awards due to some deviation from the protocols
(or where the protocols themselves contain a defect), such action may
well prompt a revision to the protocols. At the same time, as courts
confirm awards rendered in accordance with protocol-based procedures,
the protocols will develop a type of quasi-legal status that enables them
to serve as a benchmark for enforceability of an award.
This Part has examined the exercise of and limits on procedural
contractual freedom. Using the delegation clause from Rent-A-Center
as a point of reference, it demonstrated that the use of such clauses
varies widely across types of contracts. It showed further that, when
such clauses are absent, the incorporation of institutional rules (such as
AAA Rule 7(a)) can achieve the same effect indirectly (at least so long
as the view of the federal appellate courts prevails over that of the
Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of International Commercial
Arbitration). As to the normative issues underpinning Rent-A-Center,
from a cost-benefit perspective, a blend of industry self-regulation and
case-by-case judicial oversight offers the best means of policing
procedural contractual freedom—such an approach reduces transaction
costs, is flexible, is comprehensive, and affords ample opportunities for
participation. While the approach is not immune from criticism, most
notably fears about unpredictability, those criticisms ultimately can be
answered. In the next Part, we turn to a related set of issues—namely
cases in which the parties’ procedural contracts are silent.
IV. WHEN THE PROCEDURAL CONTRACT IS SILENT—
FILLING GAPS AFTER STOLT-NIELSEN
Arbitration agreements, like other contracts, can be incomplete.
Complete contracting is costly, even when the contracts are standard
109
form contracts drafted by only one party. Although rules promulgated
by arbitration providers offer a low-cost way to supplement contract
provisions drafted by the parties, even those rules are not complete.
An important function of arbitration statutes—both the Federal
109. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92–93 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling
Gaps]. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner,
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency]; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
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Arbitration Act and state arbitration laws—is to fill gaps in arbitration
110
agreements. But the FAA has few clearly identifiable default rules,
largely a consequence of its 1925 vintage. And state arbitration laws
raise difficult and unsettled issues of FAA preemption, which may limit
111
their usefulness as gap-fillers, and are themselves incomplete.
As a general matter, arbitrators have substantial discretion in filling
112
procedural gaps in the arbitration agreement.
But the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
113
International Corp. raises questions about the extent of arbitrator
authority to fill gaps. Stolt-Nielsen involved class arbitration, a setting in
which arbitrators have often faced the necessity of gap-filling. As such,
this Part focuses on class arbitration as well. The role of arbitrators in
filling procedural gaps, however, is not limited to class arbitration.
Other areas in which the question has arisen include consolidation of
114
proceedings, joinder of parties, dispositive motions, and issues of
confidentiality, among others.
This part first provides background by tracing the development of

110. See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587–88 (2008).
111. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393,
416–20 (2004); William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for
FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1241, 1245 n.16 (2003) [hereinafter Park, FAA
Reform].
112. For example, one commentator has noted:
Arbitrators can conduct proceedings in almost any manner they deem
best, as long as they respect the arbitral mission and accord the type of
fundamental fairness usually called ‘due process’ in the United States and
‘natural justice’ in Britain, which includes both freedom from bias and
allowing each side an equal right to be heard.
William W. Park, The 2002 Freshfields Lecture—Arbitration’s Protean Nature: The Value of
Rules and the Risks of Discretion, 19 ARB. INT’L 279, 281 (2003) [hereinafter Park,
Arbitration’s Protean Nature]; see also William W. Park, Procedural Default Rules Revisited,
in ARBITRATION INSIGHTS—TWENTY YEARS OF THE ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, SPONSORED BY FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER
360 (Julian D.M. Lew & Loukas A. Mistelis eds., 2007) [hereinafter Park, Procedural Default
Rules Revisited].
113. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
114. D. Brian King & Jeffrey P. Commission, Summary Judgment in International
Arbitration: The “Nay” Case 4 (2010) (Paper Presented at ABA International Law Spring
2010 Meeting – Common Law Summary Judgment in International Arbitration), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/spring2010/materials/Common%20Law%20Summary%20
Judgment%20in%20International%20Arbitration/King%20-%20Commission.pdf
(“[T]he
major institutional commercial arbitration rules lack an express grant of power to tribunals
summarily to dispose of cases. In the light of this, arbitrators have, for the most part, been
reluctant to rely on implicit, gap-filling or inherent powers to introduce such a procedure.”).
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the law and practice of class arbitration. It then analyzes the possible
doctrinal implications of Stolt-Nielsen for arbitrator procedural gapfilling. It next examines the positive question of interest to us—how
arbitrators fill procedural gaps in arbitration agreements. Finally, this
part considers the normative question of the optimal institutional
framework for procedural gap-filling in arbitration.
A. Background on Class Arbitration
1. From Bazzle . . .
115

Although class arbitration has been around for over 25 years, its
use did not become widespread until after the Supreme Court’s 2003
116
decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle. In Bazzle, the Court
granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration
Act . . . prohibits class-action procedures from being superimposed onto
an arbitration agreement that does not provide for class-action
117
arbitration.” The South Carolina Supreme Court had held as a matter
of South Carolina law that a court could order class arbitration when the
arbitration agreement was silent as to class arbitration, and that such a
rule was not preempted by the FAA.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and vacated the South
Carolina court’s ruling, but with no majority opinion for the Court. The
plurality opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, concluded that the lower
court’s decision should be vacated, explaining as follows:
We are faced at the outset with a problem concerning the
contracts’ silence. Are the contracts in fact silent, or do
they forbid class arbitration as petitioner Green Tree
Financial Corp. contends? Given the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s holding, it is important to resolve that
question. But we cannot do so . . . because it is a matter
118
for the arbitrator to decide.
Stated otherwise, the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision was
based on its view that the arbitration agreement was silent as to class
115. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 40–42 & n.149 (2000).
116. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
117. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S 444
(2003) (No. 02-634).
118. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447.
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arbitration—that there was in fact a gap that it could fill using a statelaw gap-filler. If the arbitration agreement precluded class arbitration,
there was no basis for the South Carolina court to use a gap-filler
(because there was no gap), and its ruling would have been improper.
But the issue of whether there was a gap in the arbitration agreement,
119
according to the plurality, was an issue the arbitrator had to decide.
Justice Stevens did not agree with the plurality’s rationale (he wrote
that “arguably” the arbitrator should have decided the issue, but
because the lower court’s decision was “correct as a matter of law,” he
120
would simply have affirmed that decision).
But he concurred in the
judgment vacating the award to provide a controlling judgment of the
121
Court. Three Justices would have reversed the South Carolina court
judgment on the ground that the FAA does not permit a court to order
122
class arbitration when the arbitration agreement is silent on the issue.
Justice Thomas likewise dissented, but on the ground that the FAA
does not apply in state court and so there was no reason to vacate the
123
judgment below.
After the splintered decision in Bazzle, several arbitration
providers—most prominently the American Arbitration Association—
set up processes for administering class arbitrations based on the
124
plurality’s decision.
The AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitrations set out a multi-step procedure for a class arbitration to
125
First, the arbitrators are to “determine . . . whether the
follow.
applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on
behalf of or against a class” and to issue a clause construction award
126
reflecting their decision.
Second, if the arbitrators conclude that the
arbitration clause permits class arbitration, they next decide whether
class arbitration is appropriate in the case, using standards heavily
119. Although the case also involved a related arbitration proceeding—i.e., a proceeding
in which the arbitrator already had construed the arbitration agreement—the Court held that
the arbitrator’s determination could have been influenced by the South Carolina court’s
decision and so vacated the award as well. Id. at 453–54.
120. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 459–60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124. For example, JAMS also began administering class arbitrations following Bazzle.
See JAMS, JAMS Class Action Procedures, May 1, 2009, http://www.jamsadr.com/files/
Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Class_Action_Procedures-2009.pdf.
125. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations,
Oct. 8, 2003, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936.
126. Id. Rule 3.
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influenced by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and issue a class
127
determination award.
Third, if the arbitrators decide that class
arbitration is appropriate, they proceed to adjudicate the case on the
128
In between each step, the AAA’s rules provide for a short,
merits.
mandatory stay to permit the losing party to seek court review of the
award. The AAA subsequently issued a policy statement in which it
stated that it would administer arbitrations on a class basis only if the
arbitration agreement specified any set of AAA rules and was “silent
129
with respect to class claims, consolidation, or joinder of claims.” If the
arbitration agreement by its terms precluded class arbitration, the AAA
would not administer the case unless a court ordered arbitration on a
class basis.
In an amicus brief filed in the Stolt-Nielsen case on September 4,
130
2009, the AAA provided a useful overview of its class arbitration
caseload. Overall, the AAA indicated that it had administered 283 class
131
arbitrations since promulgating its class arbitration rules. Of the 283
cases, 106 (37%) involved consumer claimants and 96 (34%) involved
employee claimants, while 81 (28%) were business-versus-business class
132
arbitrations. Arbitrators had issued 135 clause construction awards: 95
(70%) holding that the arbitration clause permitted class arbitration; 7
(5%) holding that the arbitration clause did not permit class arbitration;
and 33 (24%) in which the parties stipulated that the arbitration clause
133
permitted class arbitration.
A total of 121 cases (42.8%) were still
134
active at the time the brief was filed.

127. Id. Rules 4–5.
128. Id. Rule 7.
129. American Arbitration Association, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, July 14,
2005, http://www.adr.org/Classarbitrationpolicy.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 131–134.
131. Brief of American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 22, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 081198).
132. Id. at 23–24. The AAA provided a breakdown of the types of business-versusbusiness class arbitrations: 21 (7%) franchises; 20 (7%) healthcare; 9 (3%) financial services;
and 31 (11%) other. Id. at 23.
133. Id. at 22. The AAA reported further that arbitrators issued class determination
awards in 48 cases: in 24 (50%), the award certified the class; in 18 (38%) the award denied
class certification; and in 6 (13%) the parties stipulated to certifying a class. Id. At the time
the brief was filed, none of the class arbitrations had been resolved on the merits. Id. at 23.
134. Id. at 22.
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2. . . . to Stolt-Nielsen
The Supreme Court revisited class arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
135
AnimalFeeds International, Corp. in a very different setting from
Bazzle. The claimants in Stolt-Nielsen were all commercial parties,
rather than consumers (as in Bazzle) or employees. As noted above,
although most class arbitrations involve consumer or employee
136
claimants, a sizable percentage involve business claimants. Moreover,
in Stolt-Nielsen the parties entered into two separate arbitration
agreements. One was an arbitration clause in the original contract
between the parties; the other was a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate
the issue of whether class arbitration was permissible under the original
arbitration agreement. In entering into the post-dispute agreement, the
parties agreed to follow the AAA class arbitration rules (although not
to have the case administered by the AAA), and stipulated that the
137
arbitration clause was “silent” as to class arbitration. In other words,
another way that Stolt-Nielsen differed from Bazzle is that in StoltNielsen the parties agreed that the arbitration agreement had a gap.
Relying on other arbitration awards, which had construed “a wide
variety of clauses in a wide variety of settings as allowing for class
arbitration,” although none “exactly comparable” to the case, the
arbitrators concluded that the evidence did not show “that the
138
parties . . . intended to preclude class arbitration.” The district court
vacated the award, holding that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded
the law by failing to analyze the applicable law. The court of appeals
reversed, concluding that the arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded
the law because nothing in New York law or maritime law precluded
class arbitration.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, reasoning as
follows. First, the Court held that the arbitrators’ clause construction
award should be vacated because the arbitrators had exceeded their

135. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
136. See supra text accompanying note 132.
137. 130 S. Ct. at 1765–66.
138. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. v. Stolt-Nielsen, SA, Partial Final Clause Construction
Award at 5, 7 (Dec. 20, 2005) (ad hoc arbitration award), reprinted in Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at app. D, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)
(No. 08-1198). The award described the “test” as follows: “arbitrators must look to the
language of the parties’ agreement to ascertain the parties’ intention whether they intended
to permit or to preclude class arbitration.” Id. at 4. As described below, the Supreme Court
ultimately characterized the arbitrators’ award as based solely on the arbitrators’ own
conception of public policy. See infra text accompanying notes 139–144.
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authority in relying on public policy to determine that class arbitration
139
was appropriate in the case. The Court explained:

Rather than inquiring whether the FAA, maritime law,
or New York law contains a “default rule” under which
an arbitration clause is construed as allowing class
arbitration in the absence of express consent, the panel
proceeded as if it had the authority of a common-law
court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be
applied in such a situation. . . .
....
. . . [I]nstead of identifying and applying a rule of
decision derived from the FAA or either maritime or
New York law, the arbitration panel imposed its own
140
policy choice and thus exceeded its powers.
Second, the Court stated that because the award had been vacated,
“under § 10(b) of the FAA, we must either ‘direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators’ or decide the question that was originally referred to the
panel. Because we conclude that there can be only one possible
outcome on the facts before us, we see no need to direct a rehearing by
141
the arbitrators.”
Accordingly, the Court proceeded to decide itself
whether the arbitration clause permitted class arbitration.
Third, because of the consensual nature of arbitration, the Court
stated that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to
class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that
142
the party agreed to do so.” Here, the Court concluded, the parties had
not agreed to arbitrate on a class basis, relying almost exclusively on the
parties’ stipulation that the contract was silent on class arbitration.
According to the Court, “class-action arbitration changes the nature of
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties
consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an
139. The Court also held that the award should be vacated as in manifest disregard of
the law, although refusing to decide whether that ground actually was available to vacate an
award. 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3. In other words, the Court simply assumed away a possible
argument that AnimalFeeds had in defense of the award (that manifest disregard of the law is
not available as a vacatur ground under the FAA), and then proceeded to rely on that very
ground (although only in the alternative) as a basis for vacating the award.
140. 130 S. Ct. at 1768–70.
141. Id. at 1770.
142. Id. at 1775.
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143

arbitrator.”
Because the parties had “stipulated that there was ‘no
agreement’” to authorize class arbitration, “it follows that the parties
144
cannot be compelled to submit their dispute to class arbitration.”
B. Stolt-Nielsen and Arbitrator Procedural Gap-Filling
Each of these three aspects of the Supreme Court’s decision in StoltNielsen—(1) vacating the award for excess of authority; (2) resolving the
class arbitration issue itself; and (3) concluding that the parties had not
agreed to class arbitration—has potentially important implications for
the authority of arbitrators to fill procedural gaps in arbitration
145
agreements. This section considers the doctrinal implications of each
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1776. On its facts, Stolt-Nielsen presented at least two other issues that the
Court did not expressly decide. First, the circuits currently are split on whether courts should
vacate “non-domestic” awards—awards made in the United States but with an international
nexus—using FAA Section 10 or using the grounds set out in Article V of the New York
Convention. Compare Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126
F.3d 15, 23–25 (2d Cir. 1997) (basing decision on Section 10 grounds), with Indus. Risk
Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1441–46 (11th Cir. 1998)
(basing decision on Article V grounds). Stolt-Nielsen came from the Second Circuit, so not
surprisingly the Court of Appeals, consistent with circuit precedent, reviewed the award
under Section 10. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1766
(2010). The Supreme Court did not address the issue, but likewise used the Section 10
vacatur grounds. Id. at 1767–68. Second, U.S. courts have not definitively resolved whether
partial awards (awards that resolve finally some but not all issues in the arbitration, like the
clause construction award in Stolt-Nielsen) are subject to vacatur under the FAA. Cf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 1-1 reporter’s note a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2010). The Supreme Court
expressly rejected the argument that the partial award was not ripe for review under
constitutional standards. 130 S. Ct. at 1767 n.2. But it refused to address prudential ripeness,
finding it not timely raised. Id.
145. One note as a matter of terminology: The Court in Stolt-Nielsen seems to reject the
idea that the case involves procedure at all. It explains:
The dissent minimizes these crucial differences by characterizing the
question before the arbitrators as being merely what “procedural mode”
was available to present AnimalFeeds’ claims. If the question were that
simple, there would be no need to consider the parties’ intent with respect
to class arbitration. But the FAA requires more. Contrary to the dissent,
but consistent with our precedents emphasizing the consensual basis of
arbitration, we see the question as being whether the parties agreed to
authorize class arbitration.
Id. at 1776 (citations omitted). The Court might be read as saying that the case does not
involve arbitral procedure, but rather the jurisdiction of the arbitrators (an arbitrability issue,
in the Court’s usual, confusing, parlance). The problem with that view, as the Court itself
acknowledged, is that the parties in Stolt-Nielsen had expressly agreed in a post-dispute
arbitration agreement to arbitrate the issue of whether the original arbitration agreement
permitted class arbitration. Id. at 1772 (“But we need not revisit that question here because
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146

of those aspects of the opinion in turn.

1. Arbitrator Authority to Fill Procedural Gaps
So what does Stolt-Nielsen decide about arbitrator authority to fill
procedural gaps in the arbitration agreement in the first instance? If the
opinion is viewed narrowly, the Court actually may decide very little.
Given the Court’s emphasis on ensuring that parties not be required to
arbitrate if they have not agreed to do so, the Stolt-Nielsen opinion
might be limited to class arbitration and comparable, essentially
jurisdictional, issues.
But the Court’s language is much broader. It states:
 “It is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and
application of the agreement and effectively ‘dispense[s] his
own brand of industrial justice’ that his decision may be
147
unenforceable.”
 “In that situation, an arbitration decision may be vacated
under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA on the ground that the arbitrator
‘exceeded [his] powers,’ for the task of an arbitrator is to
148
interpret and enforce a contract, not to make public policy.”
 “Rather than inquiring whether the FAA, maritime law, or
New York law contains a ‘default rule’ under which an
arbitration clause is construed as allowing class arbitration in
the absence of express consent, the panel proceeded as if it had
the authority of a common-law court to develop what it viewed
149
as the best rule to be applied in such a situation.”
the parties’ supplemental agreement expressly assigned this issue to the arbitration panel, and
no party argues that this assignment was impermissible.”). As a result, the Court could not
treat the arbitrators’ decision as one involving the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, because the parties
had clearly given the arbitrators jurisdiction to decide the issue.
Instead, the Court’s discussion of the “procedural mode” of the arbitration (or the lack
thereof) in Stolt-Nielsen was in the part of the opinion dealing with the proper default rule.
Id. at 1775. In essence, the Court was holding that the default rule in Stolt-Nielsen was no
class arbitration, and rejecting an alternative default that the issue was within the arbitrators’
usual discretion over procedural issues.
146. For other analyses of Stolt-Nielsen, see generally William G. Whitehill, Class
Actions and Arbitration Murky Waters: Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp., 4 WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 1 (2010); Stipanowich, supra note 20, at 5–15.
147. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010)
(alteration in original) (quoting Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S.
504, 509 (2001) (per curiam)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1768–69.
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What the Court means by “the best rule to be applied in such a
situation” is not clear, but it sure sounds like how one would describe a
default rule developed by a common-law court. On this reading, the
Court in Stolt-Nielsen concludes that arbitrators can look to statutory or
court-developed rules to fill gaps in contracts, but cannot formulate gapfillers in the same way as a common law court can—and, indeed, an
arbitral award will be vacated if the arbitrators do so.
Such a view of arbitrator authority seems out of line with the models
of arbitrator authority previously relied on by the Court. In the non150
arbitrability era of U.S. arbitration law (and before), courts viewed
arbitration as a process in which the arbitrator could essentially do what
he or she thought was fair between the parties. Carrington and Haagen
described this model of arbitration as follows:
A Latin phrase sometimes employed to describe the
spirit of much American commercial arbitration is ex
aequo et bono—a resolution is sought that is equitable,
minimizes harm to either party, and enables potential
adversaries to maintain a valuable commercial
relationship; the role of such an arbitrator is said in
Europe to be that of an amiable compositeur. It is said of
the American commercial arbitrator that he “may do
justice as he sees it, applying his own sense of the law and
equity to the facts as he finds them to be and making an
award reflecting the spirit rather than the letter of the
151
agreement.”
Some commentators (including Carrington and Haagen) rely on this
“amiable compositeur” model of arbitration to criticize the use of
arbitration to resolve statutory claims, describing arbitration as “a
method of dispute resolution, but not necessarily a method of enforcing
152
legal rights.”
With the demise of the non-arbitrability doctrine (or, rather, as part
of that demise), the Supreme Court moved to what might be called a
“legal” model of the arbitration process. Under this model, arbitration
is an appropriate setting for the resolution of statutory claims because
“[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the
150. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
151. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 345.
152. Id. at 344.
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substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
153
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”
The Court
presumes that outcomes in arbitration and litigation will not necessarily
differ, and refuses to question whether the resolution of statutory claims
by arbitrators inherently differs from the resolution of such claims by
judges.
The Court in Stolt-Nielsen appears to adopt a hybrid model,
rejecting both of these prior models of the arbitration process. Under
Stolt-Nielsen, arbitrators are not free to follow their own views of public
policy (or “industrial justice,” using the labor arbitration terminology).
They cannot act as amiable compositeurs. Yet they lack the authority of
common law courts to formulate default rules. Apparently, arbitrators
can interpret contracts and follow statutory or court-developed default
rules, but lack the same authority to develop common-law default rules
154
as judges.
In so holding, the Court effectively set out an institutional hierarchy
for arbitrators in determining the appropriate procedural default rule.
Initially, of course, if the parties expressly agree to permit a particular
155
procedure, there is no need to turn to a default rule at all. The parties’
arbitration agreement controls the issue, as long as the agreement is not
156
illegal.
The parties’ agreement certainly includes any specific procedural
provisions they set out in their arbitration clause or other written
arbitration agreement. It also would include the provisions of any
institutional rules that the parties incorporate by reference into their
arbitration agreement. Finally, customary practice in the particular type
of arbitration—usage of trade in UCC parlance—also can be part of the

153. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
154. Obviously, each of these models, like all models, oversimplifies reality. The cases
in the different eras reflect some aspects of both models, not any one exclusively. But the
models do, we believe, help in portraying how the Supreme Court seems to have viewed
arbitration in the different eras, and how Stolt-Nielsen opinion seems to take yet another
approach.
155. Although it is very unusual for pre-dispute arbitration agreements to provide for
class arbitration, such agreements do exist. E.g., Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 36, at 109.
156. Certainly if federal law precludes a particular arbitration procedure, the mandatory
rule of federal law would override the parties’ agreement. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(3) (2006)
(“[T]he arbitrator shall provide the parties to such contract with a written explanation of the
factual and legal basis for the award.”). If state law prohibits a particular arbitration
procedure, the mandatory rule of state law would override the parties’ agreement only if the
state law is not preempted by the FAA.
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157

parties’ agreement. The Court noted the seeming lack of any custom
authorizing class arbitration in the admiralty context in Stolt-Nielsen.
But in other contexts, and as to other procedures, there may in fact be a
158
customary practice that becomes part of the parties’ agreement.
But if the parties have not agreed to a particular procedure—i.e.,
there is in fact a gap in the contract (as the parties stipulated in StoltNielsen)—the decision suggests its own list of permissible sources to fill
the gap. At the top of the list is the legislature—Congress, by enacting
the FAA, and state legislatures (subject to as yet undecided issues of
FAA preemption) might have enacted a provision setting out a default
rule. In Stolt-Neilsen, the Court faulted the arbitrators for not looking
to either the FAA or applicable state law for determining the default
rule. In addition, presumably court decisions adopting gap-fillers would
be a permitted source of gap-fillers.
Those decisions, whether
interpreting the state arbitration statute or relying on the common law
authority of judges to fashion gap-fillers, would also be part of state law.
What is not permitted under Stolt-Nielsen, however, is for the
arbitrators themselves to determine the default rule in the manner of a
159
common law judge.
In this respect, the case represents a bit of a
watershed decision because, with few exceptions, most courts (in the
United States and elsewhere) have not vacated arbitral awards on the
basis of a procedural determination by the arbitrator as to a matter
160
where the agreement was silent.
157. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2010).
158. There also is a hierarchy of terms within these sources of the parties’ agreement.
Presumably the express terms of the arbitration clause govern over the institutional
arbitration rules and customary practice, and the institutional rules govern over customary
practice. One caveat is that the arbitration institution itself is a contracting party, so that
courts should be cautious not to impose the terms of the parties’ arbitration clause onto a
nonconsenting institution.
159. Although Stolt-Nielsen did not deal with a decision by the arbitrators on the merits
of the case, its rationale—that arbitrators lack the authority of common law courts to make
decisions on the basis of public policy—raises questions about arbitrators’ authority to fill
gaps in contracts and statutes on substantive issues. The Court has repeatedly stated that
“[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum.” E.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). But if
arbitrators lack the gap-filling authority of common law courts, might not parties be forgoing
substantive rights by agreeing to arbitration?
160. Until Stolt-Nielsen, there were two primary exceptions to this general trend. First,
courts sometimes vacated awards when a procedural decision by the arbitrator interfered with
a party’s opportunity to be heard (such as a refusal by the arbitrator to continue a hearing in
order to accommodate the schedule of a key witness). See, e.g., Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek,
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2. Arbitrator Authority after a Court Vacates an Award
After vacating the award, the Stolt-Nielsen Court set out what it saw
as its options for proceeding—either remand the matter to the
arbitrators or decide the matter itself—and attributed those options to
161
Section 10(b) of the FAA.
But in doing so, the Court badly
162
misconstrued Section 10(b). That section provides that “[i]f an award
is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award
to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a
163
rehearing by the arbitrators.”
Thus, Section 10(b) permits a court
after vacating an award, at its option (and if timely), to direct a
164
rehearing by the original arbitrators.
Section 10(b) is necessary because, ordinarily, when arbitrators issue
their award, their authority to take further actions ends—they become,
165
in the Latin, functus officio. Unless the parties agree otherwise, or an
arbitration statute directs them to continue, the arbitrators have no
166
authority to reopen the matter. Unlike trial courts, arbitrators cannot
entertain petitions for rehearing on the merits of an award. And they
certainly do not stand ready for a case to be remanded to them if their
award is vacated by a court. As a result, Section 10(b) provides
Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 17–18 (2d Cir. 1997). This ground finds firm foundation in both the FAA
and most other country’s arbitral laws, which expressly list it among the possible grounds for
vacatur. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2006); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 36
(1985) (amended 2006). Second, courts occasionally (but rarely) have vacated or refused to
enforce awards where the arbitrator rendered fundamentally inconsistent procedural orders
(the classic case is one in which the arbitrator informed a party that it need not present
certain evidence, and then found against that party due to its failure to supply that evidence).
Cf. Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1992) (refusing to enforce
award under analogous provisions of Article V of the New York Convention).
161. 130 S. Ct. at 1770. Nothing in the opinion limits the Court’s holding on this issue to
procedural gap-filling. Given, however, that the decision conflicts with a number of the
Court’s prior opinions, one possible way to avoid the conflict would be to limit Stolt-Nielsen’s
holding in this respect to procedural gap-filling, or perhaps even class arbitration issues.
162. Justice Ginsburg made this point in dissent, albeit only briefly. Id. at 1782
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2006). The Stolt-Nielsen Court does not
address the timing requirement in the statute, but nothing in the arbitration clause or the
AAA Class Arbitration Rules specify a time in which a clause construction award must be
made.
164. Id.
165. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “functus officio” as “without further authority or
legal competence because the duties and functions of the original commission have been fully
accomplished.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 743 (9th ed. 2009).
166. E.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2517 (2009)
(identifying as exceptions minor matters such as clerical errors).
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necessary authority for a court to remand a case to the arbitrators for a
rehearing.
But, contrary to the Court’s assertion in Stolt-Nielsen, Section 10(b)
says nothing about a court having the option to go ahead and decide an
issue for itself if it does not remand to the arbitrators, whether only one
outcome is possible or not. Rather, the Court’s assertion of such an
167
option is flatly contrary to established law —and, indeed, contrary to
the Court’s own decision in Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v.
168
Garvey, cited by the Court elsewhere in its Stolt-Nielsen opinion, in
which the Court summarily reversed a lower court for doing exactly
169
what the Court did in Stolt-Nielsen.
Certainly, Section 10(b) does not require a court to remand a case to
170
the arbitrators.
Instead, the court’s other option is simply to do
nothing after vacating an award. If the parties’ first effort to arbitrate
167. Id. at 2699–2700 (“[T]he annulment of an award should have no effect on the
parties’ underlying agreement to arbitrate. That agreement subsists even if an arbitral
tribunal engaged in procedural misconduct or manifestly misapplied the law.”); GARY B.
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS
710–11 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter BORN (2001)] (“When a court vacates an arbitral award on
one of the grounds (other than lack of an arbitration agreement or non-arbitrability) set forth
in § 10, it may not also resolve the merits of the parties’ dispute. That dispute generally
remains subject to the parties’ underlying arbitration agreement and therefore cannot be
litigated (save where the award was vacated on the grounds that no valid arbitration
agreement covered the parties’ dispute).”); JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶ 25-61, at 682 (2003) (“If an award is set
aside for reasons other than invalidity of the arbitration agreement, the agreement would
survive the award and the parties would still be bound to have their disputes settled by
arbitration.”); IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 42.1.1.1, at 42:2 to
42:3 (1994) (“Where the award is vacated and not remanded, . . . [m]ost often the parties are
left legally where they were before the arbitration, that is to say unresolved disputes exist
subject to an arbitration clause. Thus the parties may or may not negotiate in hopes of
settlement, but if they do not settle and one party wants to pursue the dispute, the forum for
doing so will normally remain arbitration.”); see also UNIF. ARB. ACT § 12(c) (amended
1956); UNIF. ARB. ACT § 23(c) (2000).
168. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010).
169. 532 U.S. 504, 511–12 (2001) (per curiam) (“[E]stablished law ordinarily precludes a
court from resolving the merits of the parties’ dispute on the basis of its own factual
determinations, no matter how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision. Even when the
arbitrator’s award may properly be vacated, the appropriate remedy is to remand the case for
further arbitration proceedings.”); see also United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 40 n.10 (1987) (“Even in the very rare instances when an arbitrator’s procedural
aberrations rise to the level of affirmative misconduct, . . . the court should simply vacate the
award, thus leaving open the possibility of further proceedings if they are permitted under the
terms of the agreement.”).
170. See Peter Bowman Rutledge et al., United States, in PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 877, 935–36 (Frank-Bernd Weigand ed.,
2d ed. 2009).
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their dispute fails because a court vacates the award, the parties are free
to arbitrate again, before a different set of arbitrators, to see if those
arbitrators can make an enforceable award. The parties still have an
arbitration agreement, and the dispute is still subject to that agreement.
For all of the Supreme Court’s stated concern in Stolt-Nielsen (and in
Rent-A-Center as well) for respecting the parties’ agreement to arbitrate,
it wholly disregards that agreement in deciding itself whether the parties
agreed to class arbitration.
The only exception to this well-established approach is if the ground
on which the award was vacated casts doubt on the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement. Thus, if a court vacates an award on the ground
that the arbitrators exceeded their authority because the parties had
never agreed to arbitrate the matter, or because the claim could not be
arbitrated as a matter of federal law, then the arbitration agreement
171
would not constrain the court from deciding the issue itself. But that
was not the case in Stolt-Nielsen. The arbitration agreement at issue was
the second, supplemental agreement to arbitrate, and nothing in the
Court’s decision cast the slightest doubt on the enforceability of that
agreement.
At bottom, the Court’s decision to determine the default rule itself
wholly disregards the parties’ agreement to have the arbitrators resolve
that issue. Fortunately, only rarely do courts vacate arbitration awards,
so that the opportunities for courts to disregard arbitration agreements
because they find the issue to be arbitrated “clear” are uncommon. But
the decision in Stolt-Nielsen is a dramatic departure from prior
precedent even as to that unusual of an occurrence.
3. Default Rule of “No Class Arbitration”
At its heart, Stolt-Nielsen was about gap-filling—determining the
appropriate default rule when the arbitration agreement is silent about
class arbitration. The Supreme Court held that the default rule is that
class arbitration is not permitted, explaining that class arbitration is
sufficiently different from individual arbitration that the parties must
agree as a contractual matter to override that default rule.
Here, again, the Stolt-Nielsen Court’s decision that arbitrators lack
the authority to fashion default rules has important implications for the
types of default rules that will result. The FAA was enacted in 1925,
and lacks many of the detailed gap-filling provisions of more modern

171. BORN (2001), supra note 167, at 710–11; MACNEIL, supra note 167, at 42:3 to 42:4.
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arbitration statutes. And even modern arbitration statutes lack gapfillers on some issues, such as, for example, class arbitration. By limiting
arbitrators to statutory gap-fillers (or court decisions, if any), StoltNielsen may result in arbitrators adopting what might be called
“negative gap-fillers”: when the governing legal authorities are silent on
a particular procedure, that silence will preclude arbitrators from
adopting the procedure.
Perhaps courts will limit Stolt-Nielsen to class arbitration. Most
arbitration rules, which are incorporated by reference into the parties’
agreement, grant arbitrators broad discretion to manage the arbitration
172
proceeding.
In other areas, such rules might be construed to grant
arbitrators authority to fill procedural gaps. With respect to class
arbitration, however, the AAA’s class arbitration rules specifically
provide that “[i]n construing the applicable arbitration clause, the
arbitrator shall not consider the existence of these Supplementary
Rules, or any other AAA rules, to be a factor either in favor of or
173
against permitting the arbitration to proceed on a class basis.” As a
result, the Court in Stolt-Nielsen could not rely on the general
procedural authority of arbitrators as a basis for finding that the
institutional rules agreed to by the parties overrode the negative gapfiller.
For other procedures, however, the arbitrators’ general
procedural authority may be sufficient.
An important question left unanswered by Stolt-Nielsen is the
relationship between the negative gap-fillers of the FAA and the gap174
filling provisions of state arbitration laws. That issue, actually, is what
the Court granted certiorari to decide in Bazzle, but which the plurality
175
avoided. The scope of FAA preemption, particularly as to state laws
that do not invalidate the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, is a highly
176
unsettled issue, and one that Stolt-Nielsen did not decide (and did not
177
need to, since no state law gap-filler was at issue in the case). But the
172. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
173. American Arbitration Association, supra note 125, Rule 3.
174. For examples of state law default rules, see UNIF. ARB. ACT § 4 (2000).
175. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447, 453–54 (2003).
176. Drahozal, supra note 111, at 416–20; see infra text accompanying notes 210–14.
177. Stolt-Nielsen does have possible implications for preemption analysis, however.
One theory of FAA preemption is that a state law is preempted if it changes the parties’
agreed procedure so much that it is no longer “arbitration.” Drahozal, supra note 111, at
417–18. Given the Court’s reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen—that class arbitration is so different
from individual arbitration as not to be encompassed in a general agreement to arbitrate—
one might argue that state laws providing for class arbitration as a gap-filler (such as the
South Carolina Supreme Court decision at issue in Bazzle) would be preempted by the FAA.
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decision in Stolt-Nielsen, with its restriction on arbitrator authority to
formulate gap-fillers, makes the issue that much more salient.
C. How Do Arbitrators Decide Whether Parties Have
Agreed to Class Arbitration?
The positive question we are interested in is how arbitrators decide
whether parties have agreed to regulate a procedural matter in their
contract—in other words, is there a gap, and, if so, how is it filled? On
what evidence do arbitrators rely, and to what sources do arbitrators
turn, in filling procedural gaps?
At a more practical level, the most immediate question after StoltNielsen is—what is left of class arbitration? Given the Court’s decision
in Stolt-Nielsen, how likely are arbitrators to find that the parties have
agreed to have the arbitration proceed on a class basis? In Stolt-Nielsen,
the Court did not answer the question of what sort of evidence would be
sufficient to show that the parties agreed to class arbitration. As the
Court stated: “We have no occasion to decide what contractual basis
may support a finding that the parties agreed to authorize class
178
arbitration.”
But the Court made clear that the mere fact that the
parties agreed to arbitrate does not, itself, constitute an agreement to
179
class arbitration.
So what evidence might suffice —and, equally
importantly—how available is such evidence likely to be?
To get some insight into the answers to both sets of questions, we
looked at class arbitration proceedings administered by the AAA under
its class arbitration rules. As noted by the Supreme Court in StoltNielsen, the AAA makes available on its web page information on class
arbitration proceedings it administers, including clause construction
180
awards issued by arbitrators in the proceedings.
We divide our
analysis into pre-Stolt-Nielsen and post-Stolt-Nielsen cases and awards.

See also infra text accompanying notes 225–27.
178. 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 n.10 (2010).
179. Id. at 1775 (“An implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration, however,
is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to
arbitrate.”).
180. American Arbitration Association, Searchable Class Arbitration Docket,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last visited May 16, 2011) [hereinafter AAA, Searchable
Docket]. Although the parties in Stolt-Nielsen agreed to follow the AAA class arbitration
rules, the AAA itself did not administer the arbitration and so filings in the case are not
available on the AAA web page. Instead, the award in the Stolt-Nielsen case is reprinted in
an Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari. See supra note 138.
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1. Pre-Stolt-Nielsen Awards
We collected a random sample of the clause construction awards
available on the AAA web site as of July 1, 2010, and reviewed the
181
arbitrators’ reasoning in those cases.
The awards followed four main approaches in analyzing whether the
arbitration agreement “permitted” class arbitration, as specified in the
182
AAA class arbitration rules. A small number of awards (2 of 22, or
9.1%) relied on express language in the arbitration agreement that the
arbitrators interpreted as authorizing class arbitration. The language
required some interpretation (that is, it did not state that “this
agreement authorizes arbitration to proceed on a class basis,” for
example). But the reading adopted by the arbitrators did not appear to
be unreasonable, and was based on language unique to the agreement at
issue. These awards, while decided before Stolt-Nielsen, likely would
survive application of the Court’s analytical framework in that case.
At the other extreme, a greater number of awards (9 of 22, or
41.0%) concluded that the arbitration agreement did not forbid class
arbitration, sometimes bolstered by construing the agreement against
the party that drafted it. This analysis pretty clearly would not be
sufficient to satisfy the standard adopted by the Supreme Court in StoltNielsen. The arbitrators concluded only that the agreement did not
preclude class arbitration, not that the agreement authorized it.
A possible explanation for the reasoning in this group of awards is
that the issue presented in Bazzle differed from the issue presented in
Stolt-Nielsen (and most commonly addressed by arbitrators proceeding
under the AAA class arbitration rules). The Bazzle plurality directed
the arbitrators to decide whether the arbitration agreement in that case
183
forbade class arbitration. If it did, then the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s attempt to use a state-law gap-filler was inappropriate because
there was no gap to fill. By contrast, in Stolt-Neilsen and cases like it,
the arbitrators are affirmatively deciding whether class arbitration can
proceed. Finding that the arbitration clause does not forbid class
arbitration is only a partial answer to that question and unlikely to be
181. Our sample consists of twenty-four clause construction awards chosen at random
from the clause construction awards available on the AAA web page. Of the twenty-four
awards, twenty-two (or 91.7%) concluded that the arbitration clause permitted class
arbitration and two (or 8.3%) concluded that the arbitration clause did not permit class
arbitration. The results in the text are based on the twenty-two awards concluding that the
arbitration clause permitted class arbitration.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 125–26.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 117–23.
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sufficient in the post-Stolt-Nielsen world.
A slightly stronger case can be made for another group of awards (8
of 22, or 36.4%), in which the arbitrators (unlike those in Stolt-Nielsen,
at least in the Supreme Court’s view) in fact did construe the arbitration
agreement. The analysis in these awards began with the broad language
of the arbitration agreement, providing that “any dispute” was subject
to arbitration. The arbitrators reasoned that “any dispute” would
include disputes being arbitrated on a class basis. Because the parties
could have, but did not, exclude class arbitration proceedings from the
broad “any dispute” provision (unlike, in many cases, some other types
of disputes, which were expressly excluded from the clause), the awards
concluded that arbitration could proceed on a class basis.
Although the reasoning of the arbitrators avoided the basis on which
the Court vacated the award in Stolt-Nielsen (i.e., the arbitrators
interpreted the agreement rather than relying on their own conceptions
of public policy), the standard applied by the arbitrators does not satisfy
Stolt-Nielsen. A general arbitration clause, according to the StoltNielsen Court, does not authorize class arbitration because class
arbitration differs too much from individual arbitration. It is not clear
whether awards such as these would be vacated under Stolt-Nielsen. But
the arbitrators’ analysis is insufficient under that case.
A final group of awards, relatively small in size (3 of 22, or 13.6%),
took an approach that might satisfy Stolt-Nielsen, subject to one
unknown. After concluding that the arbitration agreements did not
forbid class arbitration (i.e., that there was a gap), these awards looked
to state law (usually either California or South Carolina) to fill that gap.
Under the law of those states, unlike the FAA as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen, the default rule was that class
arbitration was permitted. As such, the awards avoided the basis for
vacatur in Stolt-Nielsen by looking to state law gap-fillers rather than the
arbitrators’ own conception of public policy. The unknown, on which
the Court granted certiorari in Bazzle and did not address either in that
case or in Stolt-Nielsen, is whether the FAA preempts those state law
184
gap-fillers. If so, then the analysis in these awards, too, would fail.
Overall, then, the AAA’s clause construction awards prior to StoltNielsen did not take a consistent approach to filling procedural gaps in
arbitration agreements. Despite their substantial agreement as to
outcome (that the arbitration agreements permitted class arbitration),

184. See supra text accompanying notes 110–11.
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the rationales underlying the awards differ in important ways, such that
only some are likely to survive after Stolt-Nielsen.
One additional note: keep in mind that the AAA will not administer
class arbitrations when the arbitration clause includes a class-arbitration
185
waiver, unless a court has ordered the dispute to arbitration.
So in
none of the cases in the sample did the arbitration agreement include an
186
enforceable class-arbitration waiver.
One would think that the
existence of a class-arbitration waiver would be pretty good evidence
that the parties have not agreed to class arbitration—even if the waiver
187
is later held unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable by a court.
On the other hand, arbitrators might still be able to rely on state law
gap-fillers in such cases, unless those gap-fillers are preempted by the
FAA as construed in Stolt-Nielsen.

185. See supra text accompanying note 129. In a handful of awards, a court had ordered
the case to arbitration on the ground that the class-arbitration waiver in the agreement was
unenforceable, or at least that the arbitrators had to decide that issue.
186. Note that the available empirical evidence suggests that the use of class-arbitration
waivers varies significantly depending on the type of contract at issue:
A report recently released by the Consumer Arbitration Task
Force of the Searle Civil Justice Institute addresses precisely that
question. The data show that many consumer arbitrations administered
by the American Arbitration Association arise out of contracts that do
not preclude class relief in arbitration. . . . The two types of businesses
with the highest usage of class arbitration waivers—both with 100% of the
cases in the sample arising out of clauses including class arbitration
waivers—were credit card issuers (26 of 26) and cell phone companies (5
of 5) . . . . By comparison, the use of class arbitration waivers was mixed
in car sales contracts (34 of 64, or 53.1%) and contracts with home
builders (11 of 17, or 64.7%). And the use of class arbitration waivers was
nonexistent in real estate brokerage agreements and in the contract of the
single casualty insurer in the sample. Indeed, the substantial majority of
cases (190 of 299, or 64.5%) in the sample did not arise out of an
arbitration clause with a class arbitration waiver. While the results are
limited to AAA consumer arbitrations, they nonetheless identify a
significant set of consumer arbitration clauses that do not include class
arbitration waivers.
Drahozal & Ware, supra note 34, at 472–73 (footnotes omitted).
187. E.g., Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2010):
Our conclusion that a given agreement is invalid and unenforceable does
not mean that the parties in fact reached the opposite agreement. Thus,
excising the Note’s class action and class arbitration waiver clause leaves
the Note silent as to the permissibility of class-based arbitration, and
under Stolt-Nielsen we have no authority to order class-based arbitration.
Id.
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2. Post-Stolt-Nielsen Cases and Awards
As of January 1, 2011, over eight months had passed since the
decision in Stolt-Nielsen. Subsequent events provide even better insights
into the likely effect of the case on the future of class arbitration and on
how arbitrators are likely to fill gaps in arbitration agreements. Two
points are noteworthy.
First, filings of new class arbitration cases before the AAA appear to
have almost completely dried up. Based on cases posted on the AAA’s
class arbitration web site, only one new class arbitration claim was filed
with the AAA in the eight months after the Supreme Court’s decision in
188
Stolt-Nielsen. By comparison, at least five cases were filed during the
first four months of 2010 and at least thirty-three cases were filed during
189
2009.
Second, as of January 1, 2011, arbitrators have filed awards
construing arbitration agreements in eight cases since the Supreme
190
Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen. In five of those eight awards (62.5%
188. See Employment Arbitration Rules, Demand for Arbitration, Schuh v. Johnny
Utah 51 LLC (Am. Arb. Ass’n July 23, 2010), available at http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6226.
Between January 1, 2011, and April 12, 2011, two additional class arbitration claims were
posted to the AAA’s web site. One was a class counterclaim that had been filed on March 26,
2010. See Demand for Class Arbitration, JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. v. Bhakti, LLC, Case
No. 71 148 00796 09 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://www.adr.org/
si.asp?id=6338. In the second, the class arbitration demand was signed by plaintiff’s counsel
on April 26, 2010, the day before Stolt-Nielsen was decided, and received by the AAA on
April 28, 2010, the day after Stolt-Nielsen was decided. Commercial Arbitration Rules,
Demand for Arbitration, Garrett-Scheier v. Muller Auto. Group, Inc., Case No. 11 155 00892
10 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=6339. The case was later
suspended for nonpayment of fees. Suspension Order of the Arbitrator, Garrett-Scheier v.
Muller Automotive Group, Inc., Case No. 11 155 00892 10 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Dec. 9, 2010)
(Bissell, Arb.), http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=6340. Given the long lags in posting these class
arbitration demands, it may be that the apparent dearth of filings since Stolt-Nielsen reflects
posting delays rather than an actual decline in case filings. At the very least, we cannot
exclude that possibility from the information available on the AAA’s web site.
189. Authors’ calculations based on data collected from the AAA’s Searchable Class
Action Docket. AAA, Searchable Docket, supra note 180. Even that number was a decrease
from previous years. William K. Slate II & Eric P. Tuchmann, Class Action Arbitrations, 11
INT’L ARB. L. REV. 50, 53 (2008) (reporting data “for the period October 8, 2003 through
January 1, 2008”) (“Filings by year are as follows: 2003, 6 cases filed; 2004, 65 cases; 2005, 47
cases; 2006, 58 cases; 2007, 41 cases.”).
190. SWLA Hosp. Assocs. v. Corvel Corp., Case No. 11 193 02760 06 (Am. Arb. Ass’n
Sept. 3, 2010) (Gary, Moreland, & Baker Arbs.) (dissenting opinion by Baker),
http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6212; Demetriou v. EarthLink, Inc., Case No. 11 117 00273 10 (Am.
Arb. Ass’n Sept. 1, 2010) (Hare, Arb.), http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6349; Spradlin v. Trump
Ruffin Tower I, LLC, Case No. 11 115 Y 01846 09 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Aug. 10, 2010) (LaMothe,
Arb.), http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6232; Clark v. CHDP Condo, LLP, Case No. 11 115 Y 01921 09
(Am. Arb. Ass’n July 21, 2010) (Hendrick, Harr, & Dreier Arbs.),
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of the time), the arbitrator(s) construed the arbitration clause as
191
authorizing class arbitration.
The percentage of awards permitting
class arbitrations to proceed has declined substantially following Stolt192
Moreover, the analysis in the awards changed as well,
Nielsen.
focusing much more on state law and contract language and much less
on awards in prior cases (which almost never are discussed in the post193
Stolt-Nielsen awards). It is unclear whether the analysis in the awards
194
will stand up to review in courts that are applying Stolt-Nielsen. But if
nothing else the awards provide some evidence that class arbitration
might persist after Stolt-Nielsen.

http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6254; Owens v. Auto. Prot. Corp., Case No. 11 188 01140 05 (Am.
Arb. Ass’n July 19, 2010) (Green, Arb.), http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6221; Mensch v. Alta
Colleges, Inc., Case No. 11 516 00995 09 (Am. Arb. Ass’n July 16, 2010) (Baker, Arb.),
http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6146; Benson v. CSA-Credit Solutions of America, Inc., Case No. 11160-M-02281-08
(Am.
Arb.
Ass’n
July
6,
2010)
(Meyerson,
Arb.),
http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6139; Knudsen v. North Motors, Inc., Case No. 11 155 02699 09 (Am.
Arb. Ass’n May 18, 2010) (Daerr-Bannon, Arb.), http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=6236; see also
Smith & Wollensky Rest. Group, Inc. v. Passow, No. 10-11498-EFH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4495, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 18, 2011) (stating that, after Stolt-Nielsen, arbitrator had reaffirmed
clause construction award finding that parties had agreed to class arbitration) (decision
reaffirming award not available on AAA web page).
191. Knudsen, at 1; Benson, at 8; Owens, at 56; SWLA, at 1; Demetriou, at 1.
192. See supra note 181.
193. One award rejects reliance on prior arbitration awards as evidence of a custom or
usage of class arbitration in the industry. Mensch, at 30.
194. We do not analyze post-Stolt-Nielsen court cases in detail here. That said, it is
worth noting that courts have dealt with the availability of class arbitration in varied ways
since Stolt-Nielsen, including some courts that have refused to vacate clause construction
awards finding that the parties had agreed to class arbitration (and some that have vacated
such awards). For exemplary cases, see Dealer Computer Services, Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford,
623 F.3d 348, 349–50 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s dismissal of motion to confirm
class certification award for lack of jurisdiction); Fensterstock v. Education Finance Partners,
611 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that parties did not agree to class arbitration, based
in part on unconscionable class-arbitration waiver); Smith & Wollensky Rest. Group, Inc. v.
Passow, No. 10-11498-EFH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4495, at *3–4 (D. Mass. Jan. 18, 2011)
(refusing to vacate clause construction award finding that parties had agreed to class
arbitration); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(memorandum order indicating that court would follow Stolt-Nielsen and vacate clause
construction award permitting class arbitration); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., No. 08 Civ.
2875 (JSR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80896, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2010) (vacating clause
construction award for reasons stated in prior memorandum order), and La. Health Serv.
Indem. Co. v. Gambro A B, No. 05-1450, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135579, at *22 (W.D. La.
Dec. 21, 2010) (refusing to vacate clause construction award finding that parties had agreed to
class arbitration).
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D. What is the Optimal Institutional Approach to
Procedural Gap-Filling in Arbitration?
The normative questions raised by Stolt-Nielsen are twofold. First,
and more narrowly, did the Court properly determine that the default
rule should be that arbitration on a class basis is not permitted? Second,
and more generally, what is the optimal authority of arbitrators to
develop default rules—i.e., should they be restricted to statutory or
court-developed gap-fillers or permitted to develop default rules in the
same manner as common law courts? We address those issues in turn,
after first describing the standard normative analysis of default rules.
1. Normative Analysis of Default Rules
The normative analysis of arbitrator gap-filling tracks to a
substantial degree the normative analysis of default rules more
generally. In simplest terms, because the rules are default rules, an
important part of identifying the optimal rule is identifying the rule that
will cause parties to incur the lowest transacting costs—the rule that
most parties would otherwise have contracted for, so that they do not
195
have to incur the costs of bargaining around the default.
Such a majoritarian theory of default rules is based on a particular
view of contractual incompleteness. The implicit assumption of such a
theory, as Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner explain, is that contracts are
incomplete because the transaction costs of bargaining for complete
196
contracts are too high.
Ayres and Gertner identify a variety of
considerations in determining the appropriate default rule based on
“minoritarian” rather than majoritarian considerations: “different
private costs of contracting around”; “different private costs of failing to
contract around”; “different public costs of filling gaps”; and “ignorance
197
of the law.”
Thus, for example, the public costs of filling gaps are
higher when the gap-filler is a default standard rather than a default
198
Or, when some parties are less likely to contract around the
rule.
default than others (such as when one party is less well informed about
the law than the other), all else equal “lawmakers should tend to favor
195. For further discussion, see generally Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 109,
at 87; Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 109, at 729.
196. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1591, 1592 (1999).
197. Id. at 1593.
198. Id. at 1596; see Francesco Parisi, Rules Versus Standards, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC CHOICE 510, 510 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004) (defining
rules and standards).
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as defaults the preferred rules of contractors who have a relatively low
199
propensity to contract around other defaults.”
200
A final (and somewhat related) consideration is the tailoring of the
gap-filler: as George Geis asks, “[s]hould lawmakers pick just one
simple default rule for an entire legal system, or should they design
more complex default rules to offer customized legal treatment for
201
different markets—or even for different parties?”
A single simple
default rule would have the lowest public cost of promulgating the gapfiller in the first instance. But if the optimal majoritarian default would
differ systematically for discrete market segments, it may be that a more
complex default rule, one that varied across the markets, might reduce
the transacting costs of the parties (who otherwise would have to
contract around the rule) so as to outweigh the increased public costs of
adopting a more tailored rule.
2. Default Rules and Class Arbitration
As for the “no class arbitration” default rule adopted in StoltNielsen, it arguably is defensible as a majoritarian default, at least for
commercial contracts. As discussed above, while class arbitration has
been around for a long time, only in recent years has it become at all
202
common (if sixty-five cases a year counts as being common).
Although they do exist, express contract provisions permitting
203
arbitration on a class basis are rare. By comparison, many contracts—
particularly those in industries in which class actions are common—
include class-arbitration waivers, seeking to preclude arbitration from
proceeding on a class basis. By contrast, as illustrated in the previous
section, arbitrators almost unanimously filled gaps prior to Stolt-Nielsen
by holding that class arbitration was permissible, and continue to do so
204
in a significant proportion of cases even after Stolt-Nielsen. But those
199. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 196 at 1602–03.
200. An additional issue we do not address here is what Professor Ayres calls “altering
rules”—“the necessary and sufficient conditions for contracting around a default.” Ian Ayres,
Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 6 (2006). Rent-A-Center, for example, might be
understood as addressing what is necessary for parties to contract around the default
allocation of authority between courts and arbitrators.
201. George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules,
80 TUL. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2006); see also Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal
Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 1–3 (1993).
202. See Slate & Tuchmann, supra note 189, at 53 (reporting AAA class arbitration
caseloads for 2003–2008).
203. See supra note 155.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 182–94.
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awards often did not attempt to determine what the parties would have
contracted for in a world of no transaction costs, and were limited to
cases in which the parties’ arbitration agreement was silent as to class
arbitration (thus providing only a partial look at parties’ contracting
practices). Plus, most, although not all, awards were in disputes
between sophisticated and unsophisticated parties, not between two
commercial parties. Accordingly, at least for commercial contracts, a
default rule of no class arbitration would seem to be the optimal default,
consistent with Stolt-Nielsen.
For consumer and (most) employment contracts, the analysis is more
complicated. It is more difficult to draw inferences from standard form
contracts about the optimal majoritarian default, and consumers and
employees are less likely to contract around a default rule than
commercial parties. The costs to businesses of contracting around a
default rule that permitted class arbitration would be relatively low—
since the contracts typically are standard form contracts prepared by the
business, which may well be revised periodically for other reasons as
well. And a default rule permitting class arbitration could be tailored
fairly easily to groups such as consumers and some employees by
limiting Stolt-Nielsen to contracts between sophisticated parties.
On the other hand, to the extent businesses perceive that reducing
the risk of class actions is a reason to use arbitration clauses, they will
quickly contract around a default rule permitting class arbitration—
incurring the transaction costs (however slight) of doing so. If, in fact,
for policy reasons class relief should be available for consumers and
employees in arbitration, implementing that policy choice will likely
205
need to be done by a mandatory rule, rather than a default rule.

205. Some have suggested that the decision in Stolt-Nielsen will increase the likelihood
that Congress will enact the Arbitration Fairness Act. E.g., Vinson & Elkins LLP, Supreme
Court Strikes Down Arbitrators’ Decision Allowing Class Action Arbitration (Apr. 28, 2010),
http://www.vinson-elkins.com/resources/SupremeCourtStrikesArbitratorsDecisionAllowing
ClassArbitration.aspx (last visited May 16, 2011); James P. Duffy IV & Ian Mahoney, StoltNielsen v. AnimalFeeds International: Supreme Court Raises the Hurdle for Class Action
Arbitration,
May
3,
2010,
http://www.dlapiper.com/stolt-nielsen-v-animalfeedsinternational:supreme-court-raises-the-hurdle-for-class-action-arbitration.
As a policy
matter, however, even if Stolt-Nielsen is extended to consumer and employment contracts, it
would at most justify a much narrower statutory change, such as a mandatory rule permitting
class arbitration or the exclusion of class actions from arbitration.
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3. Default Rules and Arbitrator Gap-Filling
The broader implications of Stolt-Nielsen, however, are more
troubling for arbitration law. If the case is applied to limit the
procedural gap-filling authority of arbitrators in areas beyond class
arbitration, parties will incur added costs of contracting around the
resulting negative default rules, as well as the costs of greater
uncertainty about the enforceability of their arbitration agreements and
awards.
In recent years, several commentators have argued for vesting less
procedural discretion in adjudicators (including both judges and
arbitrators), an approach that would seem consistent with the Court’s
decision in Stolt-Nielsen. Robert G. Bone challenges the “pervasive
assumption that expert trial judges can do a good job of tailoring
procedures to individual cases [a]s empirically unsupported and at best
206
highly questionable.”
Instead, he argues for a greater use of rules
restricting judicial discretion—not “deliver[ing] a knock-out punch to
discretion,” but contending that rule makers should balance the costs
and benefits of discretion, “taking account of all of the costs of casespecific discretion and all the benefits of limiting discretion in various
207
ways, and that they should publicly justify the choices they make.”
William M. Park similarly argues for restricting procedural
discretion, this time specifically for arbitrators. He states that “the
benefits of arbitrator discretion are overrated; flexibility is not an
unalloyed good; and arbitration’s malleability often comes at an
208
unjustifiable cost.” He proposes what he calls a “Rules Rich” rather
than a “Rules Light” approach: “Rather than a blank page to be
completed by arbitrators, institutional provisions could contain specific
protocols that the arbitrator would be required to apply unless modified
209
by the agreement of all parties.”
In essence, Professor Bone and Professor Park advocate a shift from
default standards to default rules governing court and arbitral
210
The effect of the
procedure, at least in particular circumstances.
206. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2007).
207. Id. at 1965.
208. Park, Arbitration’s Protean Nature, supra note 112, at 283.
209. Id. at 289.
210. Professor Bone offers five reasons why the terms of arbitration agreements should
not be taken as evidence in favor of case-specific discretion in litigation: (1) even if discretion
is appropriate for arbitrators, it might not be appropriate for judges; (2) parties might not
include detailed provisions in their arbitration clauses because arbitrators might “follow some
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Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen may be similar, to the extent
that the result is an increase in negative default rules—rules that
preclude exercises of arbitrator authority because the FAA does not
211
address a particular issue. The normative effects of such a shift reflect
a tradeoff between the costs of more precise arbitration rules (the cost
of drafting with greater precision; the cost of unanticipated exceptions
arising that are not dealt with by the rules; and the cost of more awards
being overturned due to the failure to comply with the more precise
rules) and the costs of greater procedural discretion on the part of
arbitrators (the cost arbitrators incur in deciding how to apply the vague
standards; the cost of changes in party behavior due to uncertainty as to
how arbitrators will apply those standards; and the cost of disappointed
212
party expectations about the procedural process in arbitration).
Determining the optimal degree of discretion given that tradeoff is
difficult in the abstract, and depends on empirical issues such as the
frequency with which certain issues arise in arbitration (the more
frequently issues arise, the lower the drafting costs of rules relative to
213
the enforcement costs of arbitrators applying standards).
That said,
we are skeptical that an eighty-five-year-old arbitration statute—which
sets default rules only by its failure to address certain procedural
issues—better strikes that balance than arbitration institutions through

customary protocol, such as the procedures specified by the American Arbitration
Association or industry arbitration guidelines”; (3) parties might not include detailed
contractual provisions not because such provisions are inefficient, but because attempting to
negotiate such provisions might interfere with making a deal at all; (4) “even in international
arbitration, parties often agree on procedures after the dispute arises, especially in large-stakes
arbitrations with sophisticated counsel and skilled arbitrators”; and (5) lawyers, acting with
bounded rationality, might underestimate the risk of a dispute and spend insufficient time
contracting for detailed procedures that might actually be beneficial to their clients. Bone,
supra note 206, at 1979 n.80. Some of these reasons overlap with the reasons we identified for
why parties—even sophisticated parties drafting standard form arbitration agreements—
might not include detailed provisions governing discovery and the like. See supra text
accompanying notes 38–42. And other reasons, while likely true (such as a growing use of
more detailed customary procedural rules such as the International Bar Association’s Rules
on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, see Park, Procedural Default Rules
Revisited, supra note 112, at 361–62), do not support the use of negative default rules of the
sort likely to result from Stolt-Nielsen.
211. See supra text accompanying note 172..
212. This tradeoff is a variation on the familiar analysis of rules versus standards. For a
detailed analysis, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992); Parisi, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 198, §§ 2.1–
2.2. See also Schwartz & Scott, supra note 109, at 594–609 (criticizing use of default standards
in modern contract law).
213. Parisi, supra note 198, § 2.
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their rules or parties through their arbitration clauses.
As such, we think to some degree that the market has spoken in
favor of more, rather than less, procedural discretion for arbitrators.
Most arbitration rules give arbitrators broad procedural discretion, and
few contain express rules on joinder, consolidation, dispositive motions,
215
and confidentiality—much less class arbitration.
Arbitration
institutions review their rules on a regular basis, with no evidence of a
shift toward procedural specificity. It is true that groups such as the
International Bar Association have adopted more specific procedural
216
rules that parties sometimes incorporate into their contracts.
Moreover, arbitration agreements have become more detailed over
time, at least in standard form contracts between sophisticated and
unsophisticated parties. Even so, the available empirical evidence does
not provide a basis for adopting negative default rules of the sort that
may result from Stolt-Nielsen. While we do not claim that market
acceptance, even among sophisticated parties, indicates that an
approach necessarily is efficient, the substantial competition among
arbitration institutions—particularly, but not exclusively, in the market
217
for international arbitration —provides some assurance that default
rules significantly limiting arbitrator discretion would impose net costs
rather than net benefits on parties.
In short, our normative analysis supports limiting the Court’s
decision in Stolt-Nielsen to class arbitration and not applying it to
constrain the procedural gap-filling powers of arbitrators more
generally.

214. Note that Professor Park argues for arbitration institutions to change their standard
form rules, not for national legislation restricting the discretion of arbitrators. See Park,
Arbitration’s Protean Nature, supra note 112, at 289. In effect, he is participating in the
market to make it perform better, rather than seeking a legislative change because the market
is not functioning well.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 172–73.
216. E.g., INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3–5 (May 22, 2004), http://www.ibanet.org/
Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=E2FE5E72-EB14-4BBA-B10D-D33DAFEE8918;
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
2–3
(May
29,
2010),
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid= 68336C49-4106-46BF-A1C6A8F0880444DC.
217. Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and
International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79, 98–110 (2000); Peter
B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV. 151,
161–65 (2004).
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V. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE RETURN TO
CONTRACT AND JURISDICTION
The greater judicial solicitude for arbitration agreements that took
root in the early 1970s and fully blossomed by the late 1980s has created
unprecedented opportunities for parties to enter into “procedural
contracts.” Those contracts cover matters far beyond designation of the
applicable law or exclusive forum. Whether through explicit terms or
incorporation of arbitral rules, they also address an array of procedural
matters such as collective litigation, discovery, limitations periods,
available remedies, and the allocation of power between courts and
arbitrators. When used actively, they can shape the outcome of a
dispute; when ignored, they arguably create gaps that arbitrators must
fill subject, potentially, to judicial review.
This paper has undertaken a systematic examination of these
procedural contracts, along both positive and normative lines. As a
positive matter, we have seen that some parties are increasingly
exercising their freedom to enter into procedural contracts, though they
appear more inclined to leave some procedural terms like discovery
unregulated. We also found that, despite the regular need for
arbitrators to exercise their gap-filling authority, they have not
developed a consistent method for filling gaps in procedural contracts,
at least as to the availability of class arbitration. As a normative matter,
we have favored a system of oversight that relies on a blend of industry
self-regulation and case-by-case judicial scrutiny, over more blunt
approaches such as regulation by an administrative agency or outright
statutory prohibitions. Finally, we also have misgivings about the
Supreme Court’s heavy-handedness in Stolt-Nielsen.
While that
decision can in principle be limited to the precise issue of an arbitrator’s
authority to order class arbitration in the face of a silent agreement, it
certainly opens the door for significant post-award litigation over other
gap-filling determinations by the arbitrator.
In this conclusion, we trace the implications of our findings for two
pending matters, one on the judicial agenda and one on the legislative
agenda. The first is AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, pending before
the Supreme Court; the second is the Arbitration Fairness Act.
A. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
Concepcion concerns a nettlesome question under Section 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act—namely whether the FAA preempts a state
court’s finding that the presence of a class-arbitration waiver in an
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arbitration clause renders the clause unenforceable? The underlying
argument runs as follows: class-arbitration waivers typically are
contained in contracts between parties of unequal bargaining positions
(a consumer or employee and a company). The class-arbitration waiver
represents an effort by the company to preclude class arbitration against
the company and, thereby, discourages an injured customer from
pursuing her claim at all. Consequently, the class-arbitration waiver
effectively functions like an exculpatory clause. For these reasons, the
argument concludes, the class-arbitration waiver is unconscionable.
Because unconscionability is a “ground for the revocation of any
contract” under Section 2, the clause is also unenforceable.
Viewed through the lens of this paper, Concepcion presents the sort
of normative question that we explored in Part II, namely the limits on
the parties’ freedom to enter into procedural contracts. At one level,
the argument advanced in Concepcion fits comfortably within the
normative framework that we defend—namely as a form of case-by-case
judicial oversight through the use of generally applicable contract
doctrines under Section 2. At another level, however, Concepcion
218
illustrates how such a framework might be abused.
To understand why, imagine if a state legislature enacted a law that
declared arbitration clauses invalid when they prevented parties from
participating in class actions in court. Such a statute would be
preempted because it would invalidate all arbitration clauses—all
arbitration clauses prevent parties from participating in class actions in
219
court. The result would be the same, one would think, regardless of
whether the state law provided more broadly that all clauses that
prevent parties from participating in class actions in court are
220
preempted (which would apply also to class-action waivers).
Nor
should it matter that the state rule was implemented by courts under the
221
guise of unconscionability—the rule would be preempted nonetheless.
218. At this point in the paper, it is appropriate to disclose that one of us (Rutledge)
served as counsel to an amicus curiae in several cases, including one pending before the
Florida Supreme Court (Pendergast v. Sprint-Nextel), in which an argument along these lines
was advanced. The other of us (Drahozal) provided comments on a draft of the law
professors’ amicus brief in Concepcion, although he was not a party to the brief.
219. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683–86 (1996); AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268–70, 271–72 (1995).
220. Drahozal, supra note 111, at 408–10.
221. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). Counsel for Concepcion
conceded as much before the Supreme Court. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-893 (U.S. argued Nov. 9, 2010) (“[I]s the rule
tantamount to a rule of non-enforceability of arbitration agreements[?]”).
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The reason Concepcion is a difficult case is that the state
unconscionability rule there invalidates class-arbitration waivers, and
222
not all arbitration clauses include class-arbitration waivers. That said,
if the state legislature enacted a statute invalidating arbitration clauses
that included class-arbitration waivers, there is a good doctrinal
argument that the state statute would be preempted. Moreover, as a
theoretical matter, such a law would run afoul of our own framework
which favors case-by-case judicial oversight over blunt legislative
prohibitions.
The use of the unconscionability doctrine in Concepcion still appears
to be indistinguishable from the above-described (albeit narrower)
legislative prohibition. It still attempts to accomplish indirectly, through
twisting the unconscionability doctrine, what the FAA may preclude
223
state legislatures from doing directly.
Not only is such an outcome
illogical, it is decidedly undemocratic. It licenses judges (who may or
may not be elected) to announce rules under the guise of generally
applicable state contract law that democratically elected state legislators
themselves could not. Moreover, because all this occurs under the guise
of generally applicable contract law, such arguments—unless policed—
224
run the risk of distorting contract doctrines more generally.
There is a counterargument that some members of the Court
appeared sympathetic to during oral argument in Concepcion: that as
long as the state court would invalidate other waivers of class relief (or
exculpatory clauses) as unconscionable, the use of the unconscionability
222. See supra note 186.
223. Thus, it is not alone enough that the court uses a generally applicable contract law
defense such as unconscionability. It must apply that defense in the same way to arbitration
agreements as it applies the defense to other contract provisions. For an easy example of a
court applying a general contract law defense differently to arbitration clauses than to other
contract clauses, see Arkansas’ development of a special mutuality requirement for
arbitration clauses that is not applicable to other contract provisions. Drahozal, supra note
111, at 411 n.138.
224. Recent research indicates that the litigation over the enforceability of arbitration
has come to dominate the development of general principles of contract law. According to
one recent study, “battles over arbitration clauses likely constitute a plurality of all contract
cases.” Horton, The Shadow Terms, supra note 7, at 658; see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1449–50 (2008). Some research suggests that litigation over the
enforceability of arbitration agreements accounts for the development of most
unconscionability law, a sharp change from the state of affairs twenty-five years ago. See
Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 185, 185–189 (2004). Recent evidence suggests that
this volume of litigation has begun to abate, perhaps as the doctrinal gaps are filled. See
Bruhl, supra, at 1489.
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doctrine to invalidate class-arbitration waivers should not be preempted.
Ironically, it is Stolt-Nielsen, rather than the Supreme Court’s prior
preemption cases, that underscores the weakness with this argument. In
Stolt-Nielsen, the Court held that class arbitration is sufficiently different
from individual arbitration that an individual arbitration clause cannot
225
be construed as permitting class arbitration.
Yet, when courts hold
class-arbitration waivers unconscionable, they are essentially turning
individual arbitration clauses into class arbitration clauses, changing the
fundamental nature of what the parties agreed to. A state statute to that
226
effect would be preempted under most theories of FAA preemption; a
state court decision applying unconscionability doctrine to that same
227
end should be preempted as well.
By this, we do not mean to jettison the doctrinal framework that has
built up around Section 2. There certainly is a principled way whereby
courts can apply Section 2’s “generally applicable” contract defense
standard to arbitration clauses. Yet Concepcion demonstrates that with
respect to certain more malleable defenses, like unconscionability and
public policy, there exists a risk that anti-arbitration courts will contort
those doctrines to achieve a particular policy outcome. Unless checked,
that approach would simply return us to the era of “judicial hostility
toward arbitration agreements” that the FAA sought to end.
In sum, while Concepcion is a hard case, in the end we believe that
the analysis offered in this paper suggests that the petitioners had the
better of the argument and that the Supreme Court rightly rejected the
back-door attempt to embed a prohibition against class arbitration
waivers—i.e., to change the nature of the arbitration proceeding to
which the parties agreed—in unconscionability doctrine.
B. The Arbitration Fairness Act
For the last several years, members of Congress, especially the
recently-defeated Senator Russell Feingold, have introduced the
228
Arbitration Fairness Act. The bill is relatively simple to understand.
225. See supra notes 177–44 and accompanying text.
226. Drahozal, supra note 111, at 422–23.
227. Questions by Justices Ginsburg and Alito seemed to suggest this possibility during
oral argument in Concepcion. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40–47, AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, No. 09-893 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2010).
228. Here, it is appropriate to disclose that we both have testified in congressional
hearings about the bill. Rutledge has testified against the bill. Arbitration Fairness Act of
2007: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 95–113 (2007) (statement of Peter Rutledge), available
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At bottom, it prohibits pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and
employment agreements (the bill contains partial definitions of those
229
agreements which need not concern us here).
An earlier version of
the bill also provided that courts, not arbitrators, will resolve any
challenges to the arbitration agreement (apparently overruling Prima
Paint and the First Options “clear and unmistakable” standard). In its
current form, the bill operates retroactively—insofar as it applies to
disputes that arise after the date of its enactment, irrespective of when
the parties entered into the arbitration agreement.
Viewed through the lens of this paper, the Arbitration Fairness Act
also presents the sort of normative question that we explored in Part II,
namely the limits on the parties’ freedom to enter into procedural
contracts. In contrast to Concepcion, the consequences are far different.
The vesting of exclusive authority in courts to resolve challenges to the
arbitration agreement curtails the parties’ freedom as to a particular
provision of their procedural contracts (namely the allocation issue
discussed in the context of Rent-A-Center). The outright ban on certain
types of pre-dispute arbitration agreements does not attack procedural
contracts directly.
Of course, indirectly, the ban hampers the
development of procedural contracts by preventing parties from
agreeing, on a pre-dispute basis, to resolve their disputes extrajudicially
(much like the non-arbitrability doctrine, discussed in Part I, did, only
more broadly).
The Arbitration Fairness Act admittedly presents different sets of
concerns about inroads on contractual freedom from those we identified
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Rutledge071025.pdf; The Arbitration Fairness Act of
2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 7–9 (2007) (statement of Peter Rutledge), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=3055 &wit_id=6831. Drahozal testified in the context of presenting the
findings of the Searle Civil Justice Institute’s study on consumer arbitration. Arbitration or
‘Arbitrary’: The Misuse of Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong.
(2009) (statement of Christopher R. Drahozal), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/
stories/Hearings/pdfs/20090722Drahozal.pdf; Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card
Industry Using it to Quash Legal Claims?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 121–38 (2009) (statement of
Christopher R. Drahozal).
229. Defenders of the bill argue that they do not oppose arbitration, but merely binding
pre-dispute arbitration agreements. They contend that, if arbitration really does offer
comparative advantages over other forms of dispute resolution, then those advantages will
remain after an actual dispute has arisen and, under the Act, parties remain free to enter into
post-dispute arbitration agreements. For an argument that the promise of post-dispute
arbitration is illusory, see generally Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The
Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267 (2008).
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in Concepcion. It does not raise the same legitimacy concerns because
the bill, if enacted, would be the result of a legislative process. Nor does
the bill distort the development of more general contract law; it simply
modifies the Section 2 standard.
Nonetheless, under the normative framework we have developed
here, we think that Congress should not adopt it. At bottom, the bill,
however well-intentioned, works too great an inroad on contractual
freedom without there being a sufficiently compelling empirical case for
230
some offsetting benefit. The bill puts all employment and consumer
agreements on the same plane without considering whether the need for
regulation might vary across types of agreement or within subcategories
of a single agreement. Thus, we doubt that a highly paid corporate
executive whose contract contains an arbitration agreement needs the
231
same degree of paternalistic regulation as a line employee.
As the
protocols demonstrate, industry self-regulation (coupled with judicial
oversight) affords a greater opportunity to adapt rules to these nuances
and avoids the meat-cleaver approach exemplified by the bill.
A further flaw in the bill is that, if enacted, it would hinder the sort
of reexamination that should occur in light of new empirical evidence.
As we have explained in great detail elsewhere, the empirical record on
arbitration remains incomplete, though important gaps are being filled.
If the bill is enacted, the risk is that Congress will naturally turn to other
matters, and occasions for reexamination will be scant. By contrast,
through industry self-regulation such as the protocols, the industry itself
has a natural incentive regularly to reexamine whether the protocols
sufficiently take into the account the extant empirical evidence. This
helps to avoid risks that awards might be declared unenforceable, an
232
outcome that arbitral institutions have a natural incentive to avoid.

230. For discussions of the state of empirical literature on the issues surrounding the
Arbitration Fairness Act, see generally Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 88, at 847–62; Peter B.
Rutledge, Arbitration Reform: What We Know and What We Need to Know, 10 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 579 (2009).
231. See E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers from
Legislation Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 591, 593–600 (2009).
232. A good example of this phenomenon is the debate in the 1990s over the allocation
of arbitration costs. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Cole v.
Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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C. Looking Ahead
This Article has offered a systematic treatment of procedural
contracts and placed them in the context of contemporary judicial and
congressional debates. Much work, however, remains to be done,
particularly on the empirical side. Specifically, over the long-run,
scholars should attempt to develop more sophisticated data sets on the
terms of procedural contracts, especially datasets like the franchise
database that permit comparisons of how the use of such terms evolves
over time. Furthermore, it is hoped that additional arbitration
associations, not just the American Arbitration Association, will make
available databases of arbitration awards so scholars can investigate
further how arbitrators exercise their gap-filling authority in the face of
silent procedural contracts. Finally, future research should unpack the
causes behind some of the curious trends that our empirical research
uncovered such as the surprisingly high frequency with which parties
leave certain terms, like discovery, unregulated in their procedural
contracts.

